By Ville Kari, Assistant Professor, Tilburg University
Table of Contents
- The Question of Palestine 1897-1939
- The Partition of Palestine 1937-1949
- The Occupied Palestinian Territories 1967 –
- Palestinian Statehood, Schism, and the Question of Normalisation 1988 –
- The Israel-Hamas War of 2023 –
- Other Documents of Interest
- Academic Appeals / Civil society sources
The Question of Palestine 1897-1939
1882: Leon Pinsker, Auto-Emancipation. Written after widespread Russian pogroms that followed the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, Pinsker’s pamphlet urged Jews to achieve self-liberation through national independence. It diagnosed antisemitism as a permanent condition and argued that only a sovereign Jewish homeland could ensure their security and dignity.
1896: Theodor Herzl, A Jewish State, laid the foundations of political Zionism. Reacting to the entrenched European culture of antisemitism, Herzl argued that Jews could secure their safety and equality only through establishing a sovereign state, and proposed organised migration with international support for a Jewish homeland.
1897: The official proceedings of the First Zionist Congress, Basel, Switzerland (Original in German available in the public domain, modern English translation available in libraries). Convened by Theodor Herzl, the Congress formally launched the Zionist movement and adopted the four-point Basel Programme ‘to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law’.
1915-1916: Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and The Sherif Hussein of Mecca (Britain Cmd 5957 [1939]). In this correspondence the British Empire made promises to its Arab allies to grant them independence after the Great War, in exchange for their alliance against the Ottoman Empire. In the subsequent decades, the Empire and the Arabs would be bitterly divided over whether the wording of the correspondence included the modern-day Palestine or not.
1916: The Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Great Britain (221 CTS 323 and 221 CTS 336). The essential contents in public domain here. In this secret wartime pact for future spheres of influence between Britain and France, Palestine was placed under international administration, France received control over Syria and Lebanon, and Britain over Mesopotamia.
2 November 1917: The Balfour Declaration. The wartime declaration supporting the establishment of a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ in Palestine – while protecting the existing rights of non-Jewish communities – the Balfour Declaration became a cornerstone of Zionist aspirations and was later incorporated into the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. It is one of the key seeds of the conflict in the Middle East.
1919: The First Palestine Arab Congress – Resolution Regarding the Paris Peace Conference (Original in Arabic). A translation to English can be found here. The Congress declared Palestine an inseparable part of Syria and rejected Jewish immigration. It opposed foreign control, denounced the Balfour Declaration, and demanded Palestinian independence under a national Arab government.
28 June 1919: Covenant of the League of Nations (Treaty of Versailles). The League’s founding charter established collective security, disarmament, and peaceful dispute resolution. It created the Mandates System for former colonies and emphasised international cooperation for the tutelage of the colonised peoples. International lawyers today widely consider this moment as an international institutional continuation of old colonial structures and a betrayal of the hopes of numerous colonised peoples.
1922: The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, (LONS Doc. C. 529. M. 314. 1922. VI). Issued by the League of Nations, the Mandate incorporated the 1917 Balfour Declaration and entrusted Great Britain with establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine, while safeguarding the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities. It granted the Mandatory authority over immigration, land, and administration, aiming to create conditions for Jewish settlement without prejudicing Arab rights. Britain was tasked with protecting holy sites, ensuring freedom of worship, and reporting regularly to the League. The League of Nations Archive of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the Palestine Mandate (R14-R19/1/2413 – Mandate for Palestine) contains numerous original reports and documents from the first decade of the British Palestine Mandate. Among them for example is the first five-year Report from 1924 by the British Empire to the LONS Permanent Mandates Commission. The annual reports to the PMC can also be accessed in a convenient format at the Emory University web collections.
1923: Vladimir Jabotinsky, ‘The Iron Wall‘. The famous essay predicted that Arabs would never voluntarily accept Zionism, and thus argued that Jewish settlement in Palestine required an unyielding defense: an ‘iron wall’ of strength. Jabotinsky was a prominent World War I veteran and a leader of post-war Jewish protection units in Palestine. Exiled by the British authorities in 1920, he continued to develop his Revisionist Zionism from abroad, publishing ‘The Iron Wall’ in 1923 and later testifying before the British Peel Commission in 1937. Famously, his movement called for a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan River and called for an armed struggle if necessary. He remained in exile until his death in New York in 1940.
1924: The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions decisions before the PCIJ shed some light on the legal conditions in Palestine during the Ottoman and early Mandate periods. The case concerned a foreign investment dispute arising from Greek national Mavrommatis’s concession contracts in Ottoman Palestine that had been disrupted after Britain assumed the Mandate.
1929-30: The UK Shaw Commission Report on the Disturbances in Palestine in August 1929. In late 1920s, tensions at the Western Wall escalated between the Jews, the Arabs, and the colonial officials. Demonstrations and clashes spread from Jerusalem to other cities and and rural settlements, culminating in violence, retaliation, and widespread casualties. British authorities intervened, and the subsequent Shaw Commission’s report on disturbances in August 1929 attributed violence primarily to Arab fears about Jewish immigration, land purchases, and eventual political dominance, though it condemned both Arab attacks and Jewish reprisals. It recommended reviewing immigration, land transfer controls, and plans to address Arab grievances, balancing Jewish national aspirations with the economic prospects of the Arab population.
1930: The UK White Paper on Palestine. The 1930 British White Paper on Palestine resulted from the recommendations of the Shaw Commission report on the unrest in Palestine during 1929. In the White Paper the UK government opted to limit Jewish immigration and land purchases, citing concerns for Arab farmers and economic capacity, while it also reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to the Balfour Declaration. It caused wide disapproval among the Jews in Palestine. Consequently, in 1931, Prime Minister McDonald wrote a public letter to restate British commitment to a Jewish home in Palestine. This reassurance, in turn, aroused widespread disapproval among the Arab population. The events of 1929-1931 are discussed in the Peel Commission Report, p. 65 onwards.
1939: Report of UK Committee on the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence [Cmd. 5974]. In reaction to the escalating violence, the Report examined whether Palestine had been excluded from McMahon’s pledges to Sharif Hussein during the First World War. The Committee concluded that Palestine had indeed been excluded, and thus rejected Arab claims of betrayal. While intended to clarify Britain’s stance, the report ignited fury in the Arab world as a justification for imperial duplicity
1939: Michael McDonnell, ‘The Arab Case. The McMahon Correspondence‘. Written by the former Chief Justice of Palestine, this pamphlet challenged Britain’s interpretation of the British-Arab correspondence, arguing that McMahon’s promises had indeed included Palestine.
November 1941: Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husseini in Berlin. He sought support for Arab independence and Nazi backing against Jewish immigration to Palestine. Germany assured him of the destruction of any Jewish homeland. Al-Husseini (1897–1974) was appointed Grand Mufti in 1921, led Palestinian Arab nationalism, opposed Zionism and British rule, allied with Axis powers in WWII, and lived in exile until his death in Beirut. Though the Allies briefly considered prosecuting him after the war, according to intelligence assessments he had not been a successful influencer in the Arab world after his eviction from Palestine in 1937. Al-Husseini’s actions during his time in Palestine were recorded in the Peel Commission Report.
The Partition of Palestine 1937-1949
14 September 1922: The British Transjordan Memorandum, submitted to and approved by the League of Nations. Immediately after assuming the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, the United Kingdom proceeded to separate some two-thirds of the Mandate territory from Palestine. Approved by the League of Nations, the separation excluded Transjordan from the Mandate’s provisions establishing a Jewish National Home. This effectively detached Transjordan from the main mandate, affirming the Arab Hashemite rule under Emir Abdullah.
July 1937: UK Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Commission Report). The Commission was established by Britain to investigate the causes of unrest in Mandatory Palestine. It concluded that the Mandate had become unworkable due to irreconcilable Arab and Jewish nationalist aspirations and proposed the first official partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, with a British-controlled corridor around Jerusalem. While the plan acknowledged Jewish historical claims and the need for a national home, it also recognised Arab opposition and grievances.
23 July 1937: Memorandum submitted by the Arab Higher Committee to the Permanent Mandates Commission, expressing fierce opposition to the partition of Palestine. It denounced Jewish immigration and British policies, and urged international bodies to guarantee Arab self-determination.
22 March 1945: The Pact of the Arab League was signed in Cairo during the last months of the Second World War, about a month before the founding of the United Nations. The Arab League was created a general international organisation for Arab nations, and the Pact contained a special Annex on Palestine, in which the Arab States jointly agreed that at the end of the First World War, ‘Palestine, together with the other Arab States’, had been separated from the Ottoman Empire and had become ‘independent, not belonging to any other State’.
1945-46: A Joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was constituted after the Second World War to examine the Jewish and Palestinian questions. It submitted its final report in 1946. It rejected unrestricted Jewish immigration and the establishment of an independent Palestine, recommending instead that Britain retain the Mandate while pursuing a unitary state under international trusteeship: ‘That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine; and that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State.’ This proposal satisfied neither of the parties involved.
2 April 1947: With a short letter, the United Kingdom referred the Question of Palestine to the United Nations General Assembly. The notification had a tumultuous impact on the international community as it implied an unequivocal withdrawal of the United Kingdom from Palestine, and leaving the resolution of the Question in the hands of the international community at large.
May-September 1947: The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was established on 15 May 1947 via UNGA Res 106 (S-1) to address the escalating conflict in British-mandated Palestine. Composed of representatives from eleven neutral nations, the committee was tasked with investigating the situation on the ground and proposing recommendations for the future of the territory. UNSCOP conducted hearings, visited displaced persons camps in Europe, and toured Palestine to gather evidence from various communities, though Arab leaders boycotted the process. In September 1947, the committee presented its Final Report offering not one but two main proposals, with the majority recommending the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states alongside an international special regime of Jerusalem. Annexes here.
29 November 1947: UNGA Resolution 181-II on the Future Government of Palestine, a.k.a. the UN Partition Plan. After UNSCOP had submitted two alternative solutions to the Palestinian question, the United Nations General Assembly had to decide what to do with them. Instead of resolving the matter at once, the UNGA established a further Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question with two sub-committees to revise each of the UNSCOP proposals into workable draft resolutions. Note the composition of the two subcommittees – the majority proposal developed by the “global north” and the minority proposal by Arab and Muslim states. The Reports of the Ad Hoc Committee and its subcommittees issued on 11 November are found here, here and here. The UNGA debates on the Resolution are here, here, here, here, and here. The outcome of the debates was that Resolution 181-II was adopted by a majority, but only over a unified dissent by Arab and Muslim states and their allies. Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen voted against the partition.
1948: As the British withdrawal drew closer, civil war broke out in Palestine. Throughout early 1948 the UN Security Council sat and deliberated the Question of Palestine, calling for truce and restraint in several Resolutions (UNSC Res 42, 43, 44, 46) and in April resolving to establish a UN Truce Commission for Palestine with UNSC Res 48. On 26 April 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted UNGA Res 185 (S-2), referring the question of the protection of the city of Jerusalem to the Trusteeship Council.
14 May 1948: Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948 on the eve of the British withdrawal. The same day, the United Nations General Assembly convened in a Special Session to discuss the termination of the Mandate. It passed Resolutions relieving the UN Palestine Commission from its duties (Res 189 (S-2)) and appointing a UN Mediator for Palestine (Res 186 (S-2)). The mediator would be Folke Bernadotte from Sweden.
15 May 1948: On 15 May 1948 the United Nations General Assembly received a cablegram from the newly established state informing the UN of the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. On the same day, a joint cablegram from the League of Arab Nations informed the United Nations of an ‘intervention of Arab states in Palestine to restore law and order’. In accordance with its founding Pact, the League declared that Palestine was ‘an Arab country falling in the heart of the Arab countries and attached to the Arab world’ and that there currently was ‘no legally constituted authority in Palestine’. The collective declaration of war transformed the Arab-Jewish civil war in Palestine into an international armed conflict between the newly founded Israel and its Arab neighbours. During the war, Israel expanded its territorial control beyond the boundaries envisioned in the UN Partition Plan, whereas Egypt took over the territory of modern-day Gaza and Transjordan occupied the West Bank of the Jordan River. The Arab Higher Committee appealed to the UN Security Council as hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs lost, fled or were forced to abandon their homes during the conflict.
16 September 1948: The UN Mediator Count Bernadotte submitted a Progress Report to the General Assembly one day before his assassination in Palestine. His ‘basic premises’ for a peaceful settlement included a cessation of all hostilities; recognition that a ‘Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so’; and the assertion that the ‘right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose not to return.’ Bernadotte also estimated the potential number of refugees as 570,800 persons with some alleging up to 780,000.
11 December 1948: The UN General Assembly received the Mediator’s Report and resolved to constitute the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) to follow up on the Mediator’s work. This Resolution 194(III) envisioned the foundation for a future resolution of the Palestinian refugee question, adopting Bernadotte’s basic premises. Its paragraph 11 stated that
refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible
Following Resolution 194, the UNCCP’s technical office in Jerusalem conducted in the 1950s and 1960s extensive hearings and investigations on Palestinian refugees, recording their claims and demands with a view to a Palestinian right to return as cited in paragraph 11. The records of the UNCCP Land and Property Records Project is preserved in the UN archives. In 2003, Columbia University Press published a study by Michael R. Fischbach on the records.
1949: The war ended in 1949 with a series of armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt , Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria (42 UNTS 251-351). These agreements were not permanent peace treaties, but as treaties they implicitly recognised the international subjecthood of Israel, defined the armistice boundaries (the ‘green line’ or the ‘armistice line’), and confirmed Israel’s control of more territory than in the UN partition plan. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs remained displaced, while no permanent peace was reached; after the war, Egypt held Gaza, and Jordan soon annexed the West Bank.
1949: After the armistice, Israel was admitted to the United Nations, despite opposition from Arab countries. The Security Council recommended Israel for admission on 7 March 1949, and after a debate on 11 May 1949 the General Assembly admitted Israel with a two-thirds majority, with the Arab states voting against or abstaining. At that time, Israel’s statehood had been recognised by over 50 countries. In the assessment of HE James Crawford, ‘Israel was effectively and lawfully established as a State by secession from Palestine in the period 1948 to 1949. Its original territory was its armistice territory, not the partition territory.’ (Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, OUP 2007, p. 434.)
1949: Meanwhile, in December 1949 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 302 (IV), establishing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to provide relief, employment programs, and social services for Palestinians displaced by the War of 1948. UNRWA was initially designed as a temporary body; however, when the agency proprio motu (See UN Doc. A/4121, 15 June 1959, Part II, paras. 3–8) adopted a definition of ‘refugee’ that included also the future male-line descendants of the original Palestine refugees, it gave rise to a special category of hereditary refugee title. When UNRWA beneficiaries were then excused from the provisions in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention that governed the loss or exhaustion of refugee status (See Arts. 1 C and D), the result was a unique perpetual title to protection for which the international community assumes responsibility as long as UNRWA mandate is extended.
The Occupied PAlestinian Territories 1967 –
1967: On 18 May 1967, the United Nations at the request of Egypt withdrew the UNEF force (see also here) from the Sinai and Gaza. Five days later, Egypt declared a closure of the Strait of Tiran from Israeli ships. On 5 June 1967, Israel attacked with force – in what it called self-defence and what Egypt called ‘a treacherous premeditated aggression‘ – against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In six days, Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The war ended six days later following repeated calls for a ceasefire by the UN Security Council (e.g. UNSC Res. 233, 234 and 235). In accordance with the continuing non-recognition of Israel by the Arab states, no peace treaty was signed.
22 November 1967: The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242(1967), stating among others the following principles:
‘Emphasizes the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war […and] Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force’.
This “Land for peace” arrangement, reiterated and recalled by the UN regularly thereafter (e.g. here, here, here and here), became the foundation for the common approach of the international community (inasmuch as there is one) to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its key components are: first, the persistent and continuing requirement that Israel should withdraw its forces back inside the “pre-1967” borders, that is the 1949 armistice green lines, which remain its internationally recognised state borders; and second, that Israel’s sovereignty and security should be respected and guaranteed through a gradual normalisation of the international relations in the region. Implicit in this settlement is a need for Arab states to eventually recognise the state of Israel and its sovereign right to non-interference.
1973: On 6 October 1973 at about 14:00 local time, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israel on the eve of Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement. On October 7th, Israel reported the events to the UNSC as ‘treacherous aggression‘ whereas Syria and Egypt blamed Israel and invoked self-defence. The war ended with UNSC Resolutions 338 and 339, ceasefire agreements, and the establishment of a new UN Emergency Force.
1979: After the October 6 war, Egypt sought to negotiate a return of its lost territory. Following peace talks at Camp David with U.S. mediation, Egypt recognised Israel in the peace treaty of 26 November 1979, in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Gaza, identified as a Palestinian rather than Egyptian territory, was left under Israeli control. In reaction to Egypt’s recognition of Israel, the members of the Arab League resolved to suspend diplomatic relations with Egypt and to suspend Egyptian membership in the League.
1979: International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. The Convention criminalises hostage-taking in peacetime as an act of international terrorism, and provides that States must prosecute or extradite offenders. In wartime, hostage-taking is prohibited under the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3, as well as Article 34 of the Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. As a consequence, hostage-taking is a war crime under international law.
1980: Israel passed its “Basic Law on Jerusalem, Capital of Israel“, declaring that ‘[t]he complete and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel’. This has been internationally understood as a unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem. The UN Security Council, ‘reaffirming again that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible’, declared the law at once null and void in its Resolution 478, and called on states to withdraw their embassies from the city. No major international body has recognised this annexation; under international law, East Jerusalem is treated as part of the occupied Palestinian territory. One famous exception to the international non-recognition is the declaration in 2017 by the United States to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem, and the consequent institution of proceedings in 2018 by Palestine at the ICJ.
Ever since the events of 1967 and 1973 the international community and the United Nations General Assembly have regularly rejected or questioned the legality of the the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. For decades, the the international community has expressed grave concern for the future and well-being of the Palestinian population, as well as criticised the long-term nature of the occupation, citing the principle that military occupation is meant to be a short-term and limited measure. Israel and its allies, on the other hand, have maintained that the occupation is a lawful and necessary measure due to the continuing security concerns arising from the threat of Palestinian terrorism and the prolonged non-recognition of Israel by the Arab world.
The ICJ Wall Opinion (2004)
In 2002, Israel began to construct a physical barrier within the occupied West Bank. On 12 December 2023, the UNGA requested the International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the following question:
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the Report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?
In its Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, the Court confirmed that Israel was an occupying power within the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. It accepted that Israel faced genuine security concerns in the West Bank but determined that the chosen route of the wall was not strictly necessary to achieve that aim. Because it deviated significantly from the Green Line and incorporated large swathes of Palestinian land and settlements, the Court concluded it was tantamount to measures of annexation. This had violated the principle of self-determination of the Palestinian people and contravened the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force. The Court therefore declared the construction of the wall in occupied territory unlawful.
The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024
The clearest and most authoritative finding of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories since 1967 was given in the 2024 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. In this case, the UN General Assembly had forwarded to the Court the following questions:
considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and the advisory opinion of the Court of 9 July 2004:
(a) What are the legal consequences arising from the ongoing violation by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, from its prolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and from its adoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures?
(b) How do the policies and practices of Israel referred to in paragraph 18 (a) above affect the legal status of the occupation, and what are the legal consequences that arise for all States and the United Nations from this status?
In its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, the ICJ was very straightforward in condemning the Israeli occupation of Palestine as illegal. The Court found, among other things, that time had not altered the occupied status of the West Bank since 1967 and that also the Gaza Strip remained in Israel’s effective control [paras 87 and 94]. It found the transfer of Israel settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem as contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention [para 119], and the Israeli land confiscation policies as incompatible with the Hague Conventions [122]. The Court opined likewise that Israel’s use of natural resources in the OPT [para 133] as well as its application of different jurisdictions to Israelis and Palestinians [136] were against international law. In conclusion, the Court “reaffirm[ed] that the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the régime associated with them, have been established and are being maintained in violation of international law” [para 155] and indeed “amount to annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory” [para 179]. Discrimination in planning policies and legislative measures constituted “a breach of Article 3 of CERD” (referring to racial segregation and apartheid) [para 220, 229]. In consequence, the Court found Israel bore full state responsibility for its policies, being “under an obligation to provide full reparation for the damage caused by its internationally wrongful acts”. On this, the Court explicitly invoked the Chorzów Factory principle that “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”.
The Court also instructed that UN Member States – that is, third states not party to the conflict – are “under an obligation not to recognize any changes in the physical character or demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the territory occupied by Israel on 5 June 1967, including East Jerusalem, except as agreed by the parties through negotiations and to distinguish in their dealings with Israel between the territory of the State of Israel and the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967”. This duty “encompasses, inter alia, the obligation to abstain from treaty relations with Israel in all cases in which it purports to act on behalf of the Occupied Palestinian Territory or a part thereof on matters concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory or a part of its territory; to abstain from entering into economic or trade dealings with Israel concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory or parts thereof which may entrench its unlawful presence in the territory; to abstain, in the establishment and maintenance of diplomatic missions in Israel, from any recognition of its illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory; and to take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. [para 278] Moreover “all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel’s illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” [279]
The Advisory Opinion is remarkably unequivocal in its findings on Israel’s responsibilities and faults and therefore the decision constitutes a fundamental landmark in the relations between Israel and the international community at large. The limitations to the decision’s weight include the following: 1) An Advisory Opinion does not constitute binding pronunciation of law the way a judgment in a contentious case would. 2) The Opinion was rendered against an objection on jurisdiction by Israel, which gives it and its allies some (doubtful) basis to try to dismiss it (but in law the Court has the competence to determine its jurisdiction). 3) The Opinion is confined by the framing of the original questions, which the General Assembly had formulated in a manner that did not enquire on the obligations and responsibilities of other actors besides Israel. 4) It does not deal with the Hamas-Israel war, and in its only reference to Hamas “the Court is of the view that the policies and practices contemplated by the request of the General Assembly do not include conduct by Israel in the Gaza Strip in response to the attack carried out against it by Hamas and other armed groups on 7 October 2023” [para 81]. Finally, 5) the Advisory Opinion only concerns the period since 1967, and is therefore not a statement on the sovereignty of the state of Israel itself.
For the purposes of legal research, the utility of the case file in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2024 extends far beyond the opinion itself. In addition to the Parties, the file includes written statements from over 50 states and international organisations stating their legal interpretations and testimonies of the situation. Among these is the written statement from the State of Palestine (with annexes), outlining and putting on record the legal position of the Palestinian Authority. Israel’s objection, more concise, is likewise included (with annexes). Above all, the case file contains what seems to be an inexhaustible archive of public UN General Assembly documents and materials on the Question of Palestine since the year 1967. As catalogued by the UN’s own officials here and here, the files cover over 1800 documents from various UN bodies sources; see e.g. settlements, living conditions, women and children, PSNR, self-determination, ‘Question of Palestine’, ‘Situation in the Middle East‘, special committee papers, UNRWA, UNGA Emergency Special Sessions, UN Security Council, Human rights documentation at UNGA, Human Rights Council, Commission on Human Rights, treaty bodies, periodic reviews, et cetera.
18 September 2024: UNGA Res ES-10/24, implementing the Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice from 19 July. Responding to the strict tenor of the Advisory Opinion, the Resolution reaffirmed ‘the illegality of Israeli settlements and their associated regime, as well as all other measures aimed at altering the demographic composition’ of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It demanded Israel’s complete withdrawal from the territories within twelve months, and invoked the old Stimson doctrine that all states are legally bound not to recognise or support an unlawful occupation. The UNGA called for collective measures such as sanctions, arms embargoes, travel bans, and asset freezes targeting those who enable the continuation of the occupation. The text also outlined the establishment of an international register of damage and mechanisms for reparations and accountability, which might include the investigation and prosecution of a wide variety of rights violations. Beyond its immediate measures and actions, the Resolution mandated the convening of a UN high-level conference to pursue implementation of prior resolutions and to advance a two-state solution. The resolution was not unanimous.
Palestinian Statehood, schism, and the Question of Normalisation 1988 –
1964: Palestinian National Covenant or the PLO Charter. The first version was adopted on 28 May 1964. It was revised in 1968 after the Six-Day War. Critical reproduction for the UN here. The Charter established the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. It defined Palestine as the territory of the British Mandate, rejecting the legitimacy of Israel and asserting Palestine as indivisible. It declared that Palestinians are an Arab people with national identity, and that only they had the right to self-determination in Palestine. Armed struggle was proclaimed the principal means of liberation (See Articles 8-10). The charter excluded Jews of foreign origin from Palestinian nationality, while recognising Jews present before Zionist immigration as eligible. It rejected any partition or international solution that would compromise Palestinian sovereignty. The PLO mandated itself to lead and coordinate the liberation effort.
1974: After the October 6 War, the UN General Assembly Resolution 3210 invited the PLO, as ‘the representative of the Palestinian people’, to participate in its deliberations on the Question of Palestine. In its Resolution 3236, the UNGA reaffirmed the Palestinian right to self-determination, right to national independence and sovereignty, and ‘the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted’. In 1978, the UN secretariat published an official study on ‘The Right of Return of the Palestinian People‘.
1987: Sometime during the First Intifada in December 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Gaza formed Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas). In August 1988, Hamas issued its first charter, defining itself as a Palestinian Islamist resistance movement, rejecting Israel’s legitimacy and calling for armed struggle against it (e.g. articles 6, 7, 11, 13, 15, 32) . Article 8 defined the movement’s motto as ‘Allah is its objective, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.’ Article 13 stated that ‘Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement.’ The founding of Hamas marked the coming internal schism among Palestinians that continues till the present.
1988: On 31 July, Jordan declared its disengagement (27(6) ILM 1988) from the West Bank and effectively left Palestinians to pursue their self-determination on their own. On 15 November, the Palestinian Declaration of Independence was issued in Algiers by the Palestine National Council, the PLO’s legislative body. It proclaimed the establishment of the State of Palestine on the basis of UNGA Resolution 181 (the 1947 Partition Plan). The text framed Palestine’s independence in universal terms, citing the UN Charter, and defined Jerusalem as the capital and asserted Palestinians’ right to return and self-determination. While deploring the partition of Palestine as a historical injustice, the declaration also implicitly accepted the principle of two states by relying on Resolution 181 and by maintaining the claims to Palestinian sovereignty over the occupied West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Over 90 states recognised Palestine soon after.
1993: On 13 September, Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, better known as the first Oslo Accord, following secret talks in Oslo. What made the Oslo I accord so revolutionary was that it was premised on a mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, which had taken place through an exchange of letters on 9 September. In this exchange, the PLO ‘recognize[d] the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security’, accepted the pre-1967 borders in UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, committed itself to a peaceful resolution, and renounced the use of terrorism. In return, the Government of Israel ‘decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process’. This mutual recognition was the reason why Arafat, Peres and Rabin were awarded the 1994 Nobel peace prize. The Oslo I accord was followed by a further Cairo agreement in 1994 and the Oslo II agreement in 1995, while the Kingdom of Jordan entered the normalisation process by signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. As a consequence of the Oslo Accords, the PLO mandated a new official administration for Palestine, known as the Palestinian Authority, while PLO continues to represent the Palestinians internationally to the present.
2000-2002: In 2000, negotiations at Camp David between Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded without a resolution, especially as the parties could not find common ground on the legal interpretation of the Palestinian right to return or to seek compensation. Meanwhile, a second intifada erupted in Jerusalem and the occupied Palestinian territories, radiating violence widely into Israeli territories; two years into the confrontation, the Arab League summit in Beirut adopted the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. The Initiative offered comprehensive peace and full normalisation between Israel and all Arab states, in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967; a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue in accordance with UNGA Res 194; and the recognition of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. In return, Arab states pledged to enter peace agreements and establish normal relations with Israel. Israel did not formally accept the initiative, citing the ongoing violence, and objecting to the right to return clause and the demand for full withdrawal to the 1967 lines. In 2011, an unofficial Israeli peace initiative proposed an alternative solution, which sought to offer a special no-sovereignty regime (‘God sovereignty’) for key holy places, and an accommodated refugee solution based on financial compensations for past refugee rights on Israeli territory, instead of a physical right of return.
2002-2005: In the course of the second intifada, Israel began the construction of a barrier wall within the West Bank and fenced the Gaza strip around the old 1949 borders. In 2003 the United Nations referred the question on the construction of the wall to the International Court of Justice. In 2004 the ICJ gave its Advisory Opinion and found that the wall violated the rights of Palestinians.
2004: Israel established its disengagement plan (here and here) and withdrew its settlers and military forces from the Gaza strip, beginning the long security isolation and maritime blockade of the enclave for security purposes.
2006-2007: After Israel’s disengagement in 2005, the Palestinian Authority formally assumed control in Gaza, but the president’s Fatah faction struggled with weak institutions, corruption accusations, and armed groups operating outside PA control. In January 2006, Hamas, the rival and non-member of the PLO, won 74 of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (an organ within the Palestinian Authority framework, not the PLO), defeating Fatah in elections that international observers considered ‘a model for the wider Arab region‘. The victory gave Hamas a parliamentary majority and the right to form a government. In June 2007, after months of violent clashes between Hamas against Fatah and the PA (e.g. UNSC debates here, here, here), Hamas took full military control of Gaza, leaving the PA in control of the West Bank. To date, Hamas has held no elections since.
2011: Application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations. The application by the State of Palestine for a full membership at the UN was received by the Security Council but the Committee on the Admission of New Members was unable to make a unanimous recommendation on it. Consequently, no recommendation for admission was passed to the General Assembly. However, in a follow-up in 2012 the UN General Assembly resolved ‘to accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations’ in UNGA Res 67/19.
2017: In 2017, Hamas revised its outdated 1988 Charter with a new Declaration of Principles that remains in force as its operational constitution. The Declaration seeks to redefines the mission of Hamas in nationalist rather than religious terms, describing Hamas as part of the Palestinian national movement, and posits that its struggle is against Zionism, not Jews (Art. 16). It defines the Palestinian people in similar terms to UNRWA (Art. 4), declares the establishment of Israel as ‘entirely illegal’ (Art. 18), proscribes its recognition (Art. 19), and ‘rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea’ (Art. 20). It maintains ‘resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine’ as ‘a legitimate right, a duty and an honor’ for all Palestinians (Art. 23), embraces ‘armed resistance’ and ‘rejects any attempt to undermine the resistance and its arms’ (Arts. 25-26). ‘From a legal and humanitarian perspective, the liberation of Palestine is a legitimate activity, it is an act of self-defense, and it is the expression of the natural right of all peoples to self-determination.’ (Art. 39)
2018: On 6 December 2017, the United States announced that it would relocate its embassy in Israel to the city of Jerusalem. The following year, the State of Palestine, after diplomatic notes, filed an application instituting proceedings at the International Court of Justice, requesting the Court to declare that the relocation is in breach of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and to order the USA to withdraw the mission from the city. (Paras. 51-52)
2020: The ‘Abraham Accords’ (60 ILM 448) and accompanying normalisation treaties were signed in 2020 between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. These marked the first formal recognition of Israel by Arab states since 1994. The agreements established diplomatic relations, embassies, direct flights, and cooperation in trade, technology, tourism, and security. The treaties were not conditional to resolving the Palestinian issue, while they did cite mutual commitment towards a ‘just, comprehensive, realistic and enduring solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’.
2024: In April 2024, the State of Palestine renewed its application for membership to the United Nations. Two weeks later, the Committee on the Admission of New Members reported to the Security Council that it had been unable to make a unanimous recommendation. The ensuing debate at the Security Council remained divided and inconclusive on the issue, with some Members calling for Palestine’s admission in the name of equity and fairness, and others rejecting it as premature and unfounded due to a lack of actual control by the PA. Algeria’s succinct draft resolution to accept the Palestinian application was not passed due to the veto right of the United States. In objection to this outcome, the General Assembly resolved, ‘on an exceptional basis and without setting a precedent’, to welcome the State of Palestine to participate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly and the international conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly or other organs of the United Nations, as well as in United Nations conferences.
December 2024: By late 2024, various initiatives for the resumption of international peace negotiations towards a settlement along the two-state solution converged in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 79/81. In the resolution, the UN committed itself to a High-Level negotiation process then led by France and Saudi Arabia, with the government of the Palestinian Authority rejecting Hamas from future government of Palestine. The Resolution also called for familiar terms, including, ‘the withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem’, and a ‘just resolution of the problem of Palestine refugees in conformity with its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948’.
March 2025: In March 2025, an emergency meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Cairo endorsed a 53-billion-dollar Gaza reconstruction plan, which was received favourably by the international community.
9 June 2025: President Mahmoud Abbas sent a letter to France and Saudi Arabia in which the Palestinian Authority called for the implementation of the reconstruction plan and stated its readiness ‘to assume sole governance and security responsibilities in the Gaza strip, with Arab and international support. Hamas will no longer rule Gaza and must handover its weapons and military capabilities to the Palestinian Security Forces’.
29 July 2025: The New York Declaration of 29 July 2025 (UN text here and Annex here) from the high-level negotiations chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, set out a new roadmap to end the Gaza war. It demanded an immediate ceasefire, release of hostages, humanitarian access, and transfer of Gaza governance to the Palestinian Authority within a 15-month phased process. It reaffirmed Palestinian statehood on the 1967 borders, called for Palestine’s admission to the UN, and stressed that unilateral actions undermining peace were unacceptable. It called for Hamas to be disarmed and excluded from governance, while a temporary international mission would stabilise Gaza. The Declaration expressed its support for the Arab-OIC reconstruction plan and envisioned the superseding of UNRWA by local authorities ‘[u]pon the achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee issue to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194’. The interpretation of a ‘just’ solution under Res. 194, familiar from the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, is known as its Achilles’ heel. (There is a wide divergence in what the two sides consider ‘just’ and to what extent that justice can be negotiated between the parties.) Likewise, it notes that the Palestinian State has ‘no intention’ to militarise itself, which leaves open the nature and weight of any legal obligations arising from this pledge. In adopting such ambiguous wordings, the Declaration seeks to escrow the old crux issues of the Question of Palestine – armed resistance, control over the holy places, and the question of Arabs settling to Israel under Res 194 – to a later date, to be resolved after other conditions have been negotiated and sufficient political will accumulated.
16 August 2025: Palestinian Presidential Decree No. (4) of 2025 on the Formation of the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee (official news article in English). Its Article 7 provides that the draft interim constitution shall embody the principles of the Declaration of Independence of 1988, the Basic Law, and the resolutions of the Palestine National Council, and shall ensure democratic governance, rule of law, protection of rights and freedoms, and the separation of powers. According to Art. 8, the draft interim constitution shall be presented to the President of the State of Palestine within six months of the Committee’s formation.
5 September 2025: The Arab League passed a resolution supporting the New York Declaration, taking a step in favour of normalisation and the Palestinian Authority, and against Hamas. Three days later, a new terrorist attack took place in Jerusalem.
10 September 2025: The 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly passed a Resolution to endorse the New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution. Israel and the United States voted against, alongside eight other countries, while 142 nations were in favour and 12 abstained.
July-September 2025: On 25 July, the Republic of France declared that it would recognise the State of Palestine during the 80th session of the UN General Assembly held in September. Several other states followed suit, including the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Pending the publication of official paperwork, the video recording of the UNGA high-level conference on Palestine can be found here. The event saw among other things France lay out its reasons for the recognition and a general call for a definitive peace, and the Palestinian government restate its commitment to the disbanding of Hamas. Critics and realists will surely have much to say about the speeches this day. Though remarkable, the new recognitions of the State of Palestine do not constitute its admission to the UN. Israel, the United States, Germany and many other states continue to not recognise the State of Palestine, for which reason the recognition Palestinian statehood remains incomplete. The current developments may nevertheless open up new avenues to international litigation for Palestine, as well as its state responsibility.
29 September 2025: The United States peace plan. It includes the prompt release of all hostages, disarmament of Hamas, and international oversight of Gaza during reconstruction. See more below.
The Israel-Hamas War of 2023 –
On 7 October 2023, armed militant forces led by Hamas invaded Israel through the fenced Gaza border and committed an unprecedented attack on Israeli territory, killing around 1200 people and taking more than 250 hostages with them to Gaza. The next day, the PLO appealed for assistance against Israel, and the situation has been on the UN agenda ever since. Within a few weeks, Israel responded with a broad military operation against Hamas. As of September 2025, the war goes on, and is once again escalating. The top leadership of Hamas has been killed. Some fifty Israeli hostages, a majority of them likely dead, remain in the hands of Hamas. The Gaza strip has been utterly destroyed, and the Palestinian death toll estimates range from 60 000 to over 100 000 deaths. There is widespread controversy over the humanitarian crisis and the effectiveness of aid and relief efforts. Hamas continues to use civilians as human shields and to hide the hostages in its extensive tunnel network which it had spent many years preparing, while Israel has blamed UNRWA for collaborating with Hamas. Meanwhile, cross-border attacks from Israel have also struck Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthi forces in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Qatar, and a 12-day war between Israel and Iran led to a direct obliteration of Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme. There are reports of increased settler activity, violence and annexation in the West Bank. Many events remain highly controversial or unexplained in terms of international law, such as the legality and use of remotely detonated explosive pagers to assassinate the Hezbollah leadership, the establishment of an Israeli protective cordon deep in the politically imploded Syria, or the unilateral bombing-run conducted by the United States against a more or less defeated Iran.
Given the close proximity of the events in time, and the complete breakdown of reliable reporting in the era of ‘social media’, we will here only briefly list the key legal proceedings and initiatives concerning the Israel-Hamas war. It should be underlined that whether the war ends soon or later, its legal consequences are likely to be profound and its legacy enduring in international law.
ICJ Case on the Application of the GENOCIDE CONVENTION in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)
In December 2023, South Africa filed an application instituting proceedings against Israel at the International Court of Justice, alleging violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention during Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. Israel responded by invoking its right to self-defense against Hamas, and presenting evidence of the intensive use of human shields and civilian infrastructure for core military purposes by Hamas. On 26 January 2024, the Court issued an order of provisional measures, ordering Israel to prevent genocidal acts, to ensure humanitarian assistance, and to report regularly, but the Court did not order a ceasefire or condemn the operation as such. Facing emphatic accusations of genocide by South Africa and many other countries, the defence of Israel denied genocidal intent. The Court’s ruling on preliminary measures caused some controversy in its use of the ‘plausibility of rights’ test, which the former President of the Court took the occasion to clarify in public.
On the merits, the matter is still pending. Since the Order of January 2024, South Africa has returned to the Court a number of times in 2024 and 2025, seeking further measures, including calls for a halt to individual offensives. The Court has in its further orders developed and reiterated the provisional measures, stressing Israel’s obligations to facilitate aid and protect civilians, but it has not ordered a stop to Israel’s actions. Multiple third states have intervened in the process, supporting either South Africa or Israel. Written pleadings and oral hearings on the jurisdiction and merits of the case are ongoing, with the ICJ yet to examine whether Israel’s conduct has in fact breached the Convention and whether the provisional orders are being properly respected.
ICC: Situation in the State of Palestine (ICC-01/18)
The Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court had been investigating the situation in Palestine since 2015. In 2018, the ICC assigned the situation to Pre-Trial Chamber I. Following a request on 22 January 2020 from the Proescutor for the Court to rule on its jurisdiction, on 5 February 2021, the Chamber affirmed the Court’s territorial jurisdiction for procedural purposes in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Among the several amicus letters and opinions submitted in the early stage were submissions on behalf of Palestinian victims and of Israeli victims of Palestinian terror, both requesting the Court to affirm its jurisdiction.
After the war erupted in Gaza in 2023, the Office of the Prosecutor announced it was collecting evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by all parties, including indiscriminate attacks, hostage-taking, starvation, and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. In May 2024, the Prosecutor Karim Khan applied for arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Gallant, and Hamas leaders Sinwar, Haniyeh, and Deif, which the ICC duly issued on 21 November 2024 (here and here). Since then, the three Hamas leaders have been deceased. Altogether the applications for arrest warrants cited crimes including extermination, persecution, murder, and use of starvation as a method of warfare. Israel has rejected the ICC jurisdiction, and several states have publicly supported the Court’s move, while others have opposed it. As of 2025, investigations into individual incidents remain ongoing.
The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024
As discussed in more detail above, the International Court of Justice issued in July 2024 a determined Advisory Opinion in which it more or less unequivocally found the post-1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel as unlawful under the current circumstances and international law.
The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of Israel in relation to the UN and other organisations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Pending)
This Advisory Opinion is a follow-up to the Opinion of 19 July 2024. The question presented by the UNGA in its Request for an Advisory Opinion is as follows:
“considering the rules and principles of international law, as regards in particular the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, privileges and immunities applicable under international law for international organizations and States, relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, the advisory opinion of the Court of 9 July 2004, and the advisory opinion of the Court of 19 July 2024, in which the Court reaffirmed the duty of an occupying Power to administer occupied territory for the benefit of the local population and affirmed that Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation:
What are the obligations of Israel, as an occupying Power and as a member of the United Nations, in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, including its agencies and bodies, other international organizations and third States, in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including to ensure and facilitate the unhindered provision of urgently needed supplies essential to the survival of the Palestinian civilian population as well as of basic services and humanitarian and development assistance, for the benefit of the Palestinian civilian population, and in support of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination?”
As of 2025, the Court has not yet delivered its opinion. Similar to the issue in the 2024 Advisory Opinion, this decision will likely critically address the legality of the occupation and duties of Israel under international law.
The UK Hamas De-proscription Case (2025)
Since at least 2010, Hamas has been trying to have its proscription as a terrorist organisation revoked by courts in Europe, claiming to be the lawful government of Gaza. So far, its case has been unsuccessful (see CJEU Case T-400/10).
In April 2025, a team of barristers in the United Kingdom instructed by the political wing of Hamas filed a request at the UK Home Office to have the group removed from the UK list of proscribed (terrorist) organisations. The application was rejected by the Home Secretary in July 2025. According to unverified news, the legal representatives of Hamas have filed an appeal against the Home Secretary’s decision at the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC) in late August 2025.
Even though the case is but a domestic proceeding in the United Kingdom, it relies on Hamas’ public explanation of its actions and aims in the conceptual language of international law. Hamas claims that it is not a terrorist organisation but the lawful government of Gaza, as well as a national liberation and resistance movement engaged in legitimate struggle under international law. Citing UK law and the European Convention on Human Rights, the application argues that the proscription of Hamas violated the rights of citizens to political association. In a noteworthy passage, Hamas lays out its motivation for carrying out the terror attacks of 7 October 2023:
Our leaders have repeatedly referred to the causative factors that led to [October 7th]. Our former leader … Ismail Haniyeh … mentioned three primary factors. The first, was the general erasure of the Palestinian cause from the consideration of much of the world. The second, was the unique extremism of the current [Israeli] government … The third factor he mentioned was the normalisation trajectory initiated by the Abraham Accords. Normalisation provided additional legitimacy to [Israel]…
The September 2025 peace initiative
2024-2025: The September 2025 peace initiative was preceded by a failed ceasefire process half a year earlier. A three-stage ceasefire plan was laid out originally in the UN Security Council Resolution 2735 of June 2024, at which time Israel and Hamas ultimately did not reach an agreement. A full ceasefire agreement was finally reached on 16 January 2025 through the mediation of the United States, Egypt, and Qatar. The agreement was structured in three sequential phases: (1) a six-week truce with the release of a first batch of hostages in exchange for numerous Palestinian prisoners, (2) a second tranche of releases and further de-escalation, and (3) handover of remains of deceased hostages. This led to a brief ceasefire, during which Hamas re-emerged from its shelters, resumed control of parts of Gaza, and released a number of hostages in successive orchestrated ceremonies. Conversely, humanitarian access to Gaza was increased and hundreds of Palestinian detainees were released in exchange. The ceasefire soon failed with both sides blaming each other. Israel resumed its air strikes in Gaza on 18 March 2025.
29 September 2025: The United States announced a 20-point peace plan (in the name of its President) calling for an immediate ceasefire. According to the plan, ‘[w]ithin 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.’ (Para 4.) In exchange, ‘[o]nce all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1700 Gazans who were detained after October 7th 2023’. (Para 5.) The plan envisioned Gaza’s interim administration transferred to ‘a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee’ (para 9), with backing from Arab states and with international cooperation and funding for reconstruction. The plan required Hamas and other armed factions in Gaza to fully disarm (para 13), with weapons handed over to international observers. Amnesty and safe conduct were provided for surrendering Hamas fighters (para 6). No one would be forced to leave Gaza, and Israel would not occupy or annex Gaza (paras 12 and 16). The plan conditioned the reconstruction and Gaza’s future governance on verified disarmament. Until that happens, an international security presence would oversee compliance and prevent rearmament. Shortly after the plan’s publication, the White House reported wide acceptance in the diplomatic twitter.
30 September 2025: In a speech given at the White House, Prime Minister Netanyahu conveyed Israel’s endorsement of the peace plan.
3 October 2025: Hamas replied to the peace proposal, announcing its ‘approval of releasing all’ hostages, dead or alive, ‘according to the exchange formula contained in [the original] proposal’. It also affirmed its ‘approval to hand over the administration of the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian body of independents (technocrats)’. However, Hamas reserved ‘other issues’ for later, ‘to be discussed within a comprehensive Palestinian national framework, in which Hamas will be included’. Hamas therefore does not seem to have agreed to surrender its arms or to be excluded from the future government of Palestine. The UN Secretary-General welcomed Hamas’ announcement. The planned release of all remaining hostages seems therefore to take place on or before October 7, 2025.
OTHER DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST
2009: The Israeli Declaration No 01/2009, the Blockade of the Gaza Strip, advising all mariners that Gaza was ‘under blockade imposed by Israeli Navy until further notice’. Following the interception of an international humanitarian aid flotilla in 2010, a UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission Report accused Israel of violations of humanitarian law, especially through the use of excessive force against the vessel Mavi Marmara. The Prosecutor of the ICC did not press charges at the time (here, here, here). The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, which found the Israeli occupation of Palestine contrary to international law, did not explicitly pronounce on the legality of the blockade. The modern international law of blockades remains unclear currently, but the most commonly cited rules are those in the San Remo Manual.
2021: The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel was established by the UN Human Rights Council in May 2021 through the UN Human Rights Council Resolution S-30/1. Its mandate is open-ended, charged to investigate all underlying root causes of recurrent tensions, instability and protraction of conflict, covering all alleged violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. Wielding the prestige of the United Nations, the Commission is intended to investigate actions by all parties, including Israel, Palestinian authorities, and armed groups, and reports annually to the Council and the General Assembly. Since its founding, the Commission has submitted semiannual reports to the Human Rights Committee, as well as a number of special reports on October 7 and its aftermath. The findings of the Commission are markedly critical of Israel, especially in its detailed reports accusing Israel of systematic sexual violence and of genocide. Critics of the Commission have accused it of bias and called for its termination since its first report in 2022.
1 October 2024: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese: “Genocide as colonial erasure”. In her report, the Special Rapporteur argues that Israeli policies amount to a settler-colonial genocide against Palestinians. She links mass killing, forced displacement, cultural erasure, deprivation of resources, and segregation as components of a long-term design to eliminate Palestinian presence. The report calls for enforcement of the Genocide Convention, sanctions, arms embargoes, accountability, and recognition of Israel’s practices as apartheid and genocide.
2 July 2025: ‘From economy of occupation to economy of genocide’: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese. In her report, the Special Rapporteur argues that Israel’s occupation has evolved into a genocidal system undergirded by corporate complicity. She documents how private firms across arms, tech, construction, finance, academia and other institutions profit from the displacement, surveillance, forced dispossession, and destruction of a Palestinian Arab presence in Palestine. She urges all states and courts to hold companies and their chief executives liable, to impose arms embargoes, to halt trade, and top demand reparations.
Academic Appeals / civil society sources
7 October 2023: Joint Statement by Harvard Palestine Solidarity Groups on the Situation in Palestine.
15 October 2023: Public Statement – Scholars Warn of Potential Genocide in Gaza.
20 May 2024: Report of the Panel of Experts in International Law Convened by the ICC Prosecutor.
17 July 2024: Human Rights Watch report on October 7.
14 April 2025: Geneva Graduate Institute proposal ‘An Israeli-Palestinian Federation: An Alternative Approach to Peace‘.
29 April 2025: Harvard University Final Report of the Task Force on Antisemitism.
4 May 2025: A Joint Legal Opinion from Israeli scholars: The Obligation to Permit the Entry of Humanitarian Aid into Gaza.
15 May 2025: PST occupation of the D Building at Tilburg University, in the name of Hassan Eslayeh. The university’s statement here (“Update May 16, 2025, 4:00 PM”). Context: here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here.
21 May 2025: A joint appeal from Finnish scholars: Tutkijoiden vetoomus Suomen ulkopoliittiselle johdolle ja eduskunnalle kansanmurhan ehkäisemiseksi Gazassa ja Palestiinan tunnustamiseksi.
8 July 2025: Eyal Benvenisti and Chaim Gans: Our Duty to Explain Israel’s Operation to “Concentrate and Move Population” in Gaza is a Manifest War Crime.
3 August 2025: Hussain Abdul-Hussain: ‘Born dead: The New York Declaration for two states‘.
15 August 2025: Susan M. Akram: ‘The New York Declaration on the Two-State Solution: More Empty Promises?‘
31 August 2025: International Association of Genocide Scholars Resolution on the Situation in Gaza.
8 September 2025: JJAC Report: ‘Jewish Refugees from Muslim Countries: Historical and Economic Analysis, Executive Summary‘.
To be continued.
