

PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE HEARD AT PUBLIC SESSIONS (with Index)

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by the Government of Palestine
for the use of the Royal Commission
are published in a separate volume
(Colonial No. 133), price 9s. 0d. net.*

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LONDON

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1937

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Colonial No. 134

PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION

Notes of Evidence taken in London on Thursday, 11th February, 1937

SIXTY-SIXTH MEETING (Public)

Present:

The Rt. Hon. EARL PEEL, G.C.S.I., G.B.E. (*Chairman*).

The Rt. Hon. SIR HORACE GEORGE MONTAGU RUMBOLD, Bt., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., M.V.O. (*Vice-Chairman*).

SIR EGBERT LAURIE LUCAS HAMMOND, K.C.S.I., C.B.E.

SIR WILLIAM MORRIS CARTER, C.B.E.
SIR HAROLD MORRIS, M.B.E., K.C.
Professor REGINALD COUPLAND, C.I.E.

Mr. J. M. MARTIN (*Secretary*).

Witness:

Mr. VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY.

5636. *Chairman:* You are Mr. V. Jabotinsky?—Yes.

5637. You come as representing——?—The New Zionist Organisation.

5638. That differs in certain material respects in its views from the general Zionist Organisation?—Yes.

5639. You have been good enough to send in some notes as to the lines of your evidence. Probably you would like to give your evidence in your own way?—Yes.

5640. Starting from the position you maintain as to the position of the Jews in the Diaspora, and so on?—Yes. If the Commission would be so kind as to allow me to begin with a statement, I should be greatly obliged.

5641. Certainly?—In order to avoid misunderstandings, I should like to begin with a few definitions, in order to give the Royal Commission the exact meaning of certain terms which I shall have to employ. I am afraid not all those terms are generally understood in the same way. For instance, I shall have very often to employ the term "Jewish State". The term "State" does not unfortunately convey any definite meaning. France is a State and Kentucky is a State and New South Wales is a State, so I think it would be enough if I informed the Commission that, when I am speaking of a State, for all practical purposes in this statement of mine I am not interested in the exact amount or range of independence. I think the essential minimum of Statehood is some indispensable amount of self-government in inner affairs (which again would vary from Kentucky to New South Wales). Secondly, when I speak of a "Jewish State" I mean adding, to the condition of a "State", a "national" connotation. What it means is this: I do not think it is desirable that the Constitution of any State should contain special paragraphs explicitly safeguarding the "national" character of it; I think the less of such paragraphs we find in a Constitution the better. The best way, and the natural way, is that the "national" character of a State should be guaranteed *ipso facto*, by the presence of a certain majority: if the majority is English, the State is English, and it does not need any special guarantees. So that when I pronounce the words "a Jewish State" I think of a commonwealth, or an area, enjoying a certain sufficient amount of self-government in its internal and external affairs, and possessing a Jewish majority.

Secondly, the term "Palestine," when I employ it, will mean the area on both sides of the Jordan, the area mentioned in the original Palestine Mandate. That area is about three times the size of, say, Belgium. We maintain that the absorptive capacity of a country depends, first of all, on the human factor: it depends on the quality of its

people or of its colonisers, and it depends on a second human factor, the political regime under which that colonisation is either encouraged or discouraged to go on. As to the "natural" factors, they are, of course, very important; but, in our opinion, one of the most important ones is too often overlooked in regard to Palestine, and that is its geographical position. We maintain and claim that Palestine is at the cross-roads of the two or perhaps the three main arteries of this hemisphere. The road from the Cape to Cairo, passing through the Suez Canal and going up to Vladivostock or Moscow, or wherever you like, is the main artery of the future by land. The sea route from Liverpool to Adelaide and Bombay and so on is the main water artery, and I might also mention in future the air arteries. In our submission, if we were shown in any country a region or a city situated on the crossing of the main railway route and the main waterway, everybody would say, "That region, or that city, is destined to get a very big and exceptional density of population." That is what we claim about all that corner of the Mediterranean. There is not the slightest doubt that, with the development of Asia (and I do not mean only Asia Minor, but the whole of that section of Asia more or less dependent on the Mediterranean and on the Red Sea) and with the development of Africa within the next few generations, that corner of the earth will certainly be populated to a great density. An area of Palestine's size populated at the rather moderate density of, say, Wales, can hold 8 million inhabitants; populated at the density of Sicily it can hold 12 million inhabitants; populated at the density of England proper, or of Belgium, which is, of course, a very exceptional case, it could hold 18 million inhabitants. I cannot lay my finger on any of those figures and foreshadow which will be reached, but, as Palestine on both sides of the Jordan to-day holds a population of about 1,600,000, the margin is rather large, and the Zionist claim, as presented I believe by all parties, is that, given a favourable political régime, they would prove that Palestine is good for holding the 1,000,000 present Arab population, plus 1,000,000 economic places reserved for their progeny, plus many millions of Jewish immigrants—and plus peace. This is our estimate; and this is our claim. We claim that area; and I think that disposes ultimately of any suspicion that, in our schemes, anybody of any party dreams of displacing or of disturbing the present non-Jewish population.

That disposes of the definitions, and I come now to the subject matter.

The conception of Zionism which I have the honour to represent here is based on what I should call the humanitarian aspect. By that I do not mean to say that we do not respect the other, the purely spiritual aspects of Jewish nationalism, such

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as the desire for self-expression, the rebuilding of a Hebrew culture, or creating some "model community" of which the Jewish People could be proud." All that, of course, is most important; but as compared with our actual needs and our real position in the world to-day, all that has rather the character of luxury. The Commission have already heard a description of the situation of World Jewry, especially in Eastern Europe, and I am not going to repeat any details, but you will allow me to quote a recent reference in the "New York Times" describing the position of Jewry in Eastern Europe as "a disaster of historic magnitude." I only wish to add that it would be very naive, and although many Jews make this mistake I disapprove of it—it would be very naive to ascribe that state of disaster, permanent disaster, only to the guilt of men, whether it be crowds and multitudes or whether it be Governments. The thing goes much deeper than that. I am very much afraid that what I am going to say will not be popular with many among my co-religionists, and I regret that, but the truth is the truth. We are facing an elemental calamity, a kind of social earthquake. Three generations of Jewish thinkers and Zionists, among whom there were many great minds—I am not going to fatigue you by quoting them—three generations have given much thought to analysing the Jewish position and have come to the conclusion that the cause of our suffering is the very fact of the "Diaspora," the bed-rock fact that we are everywhere a minority. It is not the anti-Semitism of men; it is, above all, the anti-Semitism of things, the inherent xenophobia of the body social or the body economic under which we suffer. Of course, there are ups and downs; but there are moments, there are whole periods in history when this "xenophobia of Life itself" takes dimensions which no people can stand, and that is what we are facing now. I do not mean to suggest that I would recognise that all the Governments concerned have done all they ought to have done; I would be the last man to concede that. I think many Governments, east and west, ought to do much more to protect the Jews than they do; but the best of Governments only could perhaps soften the calamity to quite an insignificant extent, but the core of the calamity is an earthquake which stands and remains. I want to mention that, since one of those Governments (the Polish Government) has recently tried what amounts to bringing to the notice of the League of Nations and the whole of humanity that it is humanity's duty to provide the Jews with an area where they could build up their own body social undisturbed by anyone. I think the sincerity of the Polish Government, and of any other Governments who I hope will follow, should not be suspected, but, on the contrary, it should be recognised and acknowledged with due gratitude. Perhaps the greatest gap in all I am going to say and in all the Commission have heard up to now is the impossibility of really going to the root of the problem, really bringing before you a picture of what that Jewish hell looks like, and I feel I cannot do it. I do hope the day may come when some Jewish representative may be allowed to appear at the bar of one of these two Houses just to tell them what it really is, and to ask the English people "What are you going to advise us? Where is the way out? Or, standing up and facing God, say that there is no way out and that we Jews have just to go under." But unfortunately I cannot do it, so I will simply assume that the Royal Commission are sufficiently informed of all this situation, and then I want you to realise this: the phenomenon called Zionism may include all kinds of dreams—a "model community," Hebrew culture, perhaps even a second edition of the Bible—but all this longing for wonderful toys of

velvet and silver is nothing in comparison with that tangible momentum of irresistible distress and need by which we are propelled and borne. We are not free agents. We cannot "concede" anything. Whenever I hear the Zionist, most often my own party, accused of asking for too much, Gentlemen, I really cannot understand it. Yes. We do want a State; every nation on earth, every normal nation, beginning with the smallest and the humblest, who do not claim any merit, any role in humanity's development, they all have States of their own. That is the normal condition for a people; yet when we, the most abnormal of peoples and therefore the most unfortunate, ask only for the same conditions as the Albanians enjoy, to say nothing of the French and the English, then it is called too much. I should understand it if the answer were, "It is impossible," but when the answer is "It is too much" I cannot understand it. I would remind you (excuse me for quoting an example known to every one of you) of the commotion which was produced in that famous institution when *Oliver Twist* came and asked for "more." He said "More" because he did not know how to express it; what *Oliver Twist* really meant was this: "Will you just give me that normal portion which is necessary for a boy of my age to be able to live." I assure you that you face here to-day, in the Jewish people with its demands, an *Oliver Twist* who has, unfortunately, no concessions to make. What can be the concessions? We have got to save millions, many millions. I do not know whether it is a question of re-housing one-third of the Jewish race, half of the Jewish race, or a quarter of the Jewish race; I do not know, but it is a question of millions. Certainly the way out is to evacuate those portions of the Diaspora which have become no good, which hold no promise of any possibility of a livelihood, and to concentrate all those refugees in some place which should not be a Diaspora, not a repetition of the position where the Jews are unabsorbed minority, within a foreign social, or economic, or political organism. Naturally, if that process of evacuation is allowed to develop, as it ought to be allowed to develop, there will very soon be reached a moment when the Jews will become a majority in Palestine. I am going to make a "terrible" confession. Our demand for a Jewish majority is not our maximum; it is our minimum; it is just an inevitable stage if only we are allowed to go on salvaging our people. The point when the Jews will reach in that country a majority will not be the point of saturation yet, because with 1,000,000 more Jews in Palestine to-day you could already have a Jewish majority, but there are certainly 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 in the East who are virtually knocking at the door asking for admission—i.e. for salvation.

I have the profoundest feeling for the Arab case, in so far as that Arab case is not exaggerated. This Commission have already been able to make up their minds as to whether there is any individual hardship to the Arabs of Palestine as men, deriving from the Jewish colonisation. We maintain unanimously that the economic position of the Palestinian Arabs, under the Jewish colonisation and owing to the Jewish colonisation, has become the object of envy in all the surrounding Arab countries, so that the Arabs from those countries show a clear tendency to immigrate into Palestine. I have also shown to you already that, in our submission, there is no question of ousting the Arabs. On the contrary, the idea is that Palestine on both sides of the Jordan should hold the Arabs, their progeny, and many millions of Jews. What I do not deny is that in that process the Arabs of Palestine will necessarily become a minority in the country of Palestine. What I do deny is that that is a hardship. That is not a hardship

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on any race, any nation, possessing so many National States now and so many more National States in the future. One fraction, one branch of that race, and not a big one, will have to live in someone else's State: well, that is the case with all the mightiest nations of the world. I could hardly mention one of the big nations, having their States, mightily and powerful, who had not one branch living in someone else's State. That is only normal and there is no "hardship" attached to that. So when we hear the Arab claim confronted with the Jewish claim—I fully understand that any minority would prefer to be a majority: it is quite understandable that the Arabs of Palestine would also prefer Palestine to be the Arab State No. 4, No. 5, or No. 6—that I quite understand—but when the Arab claim is confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like the claims of appetite *versus* the claims of starvation. No tribunal has ever had the luck of trying a case where all the justice was on the side of one party and the other party had no case whatsoever. Usually in human affairs any tribunal, including this tribunal, in trying two cases, has to concede that both sides have a case on their side and, in order to do justice, they must take into consideration what should constitute the basic justification of all human demands, individual or mass demands—the decisive terrible balance of need. I think it is clear.

I now want to establish that this condition was perfectly well known, perfectly realised, and perfectly acknowledged, by the legislators responsible for the act known as the Balfour Declaration and subsequently for the Mandate. The paramount question was Jewish distress. I was privileged myself to take part in our political negotiations with France, Italy and England, from 1915 to 1917. I was also associated with others who conducted those negotiations. I can assure you that the main argument mentioned in every conversation with the Italian Ministers, with M. Delcassé in France, with Lord Newton here, with Lord Balfour, with Mr. Lloyd George, and with everybody else, was the argument of the terrible Jewish distress, especially keen at that moment. England, France, and Italy, three Liberal countries, happened then to be allies of Czarist Russia. I need not describe to gentlemen of your generation what it meant to any Englishman, whether Liberal or Conservative, when he read in the newspapers, especially in 1915 and 1916, certain information as to the fate of the Jews in the Russian sector of the War. It was the common talk everywhere—the feeling that something should be done to relieve that disaster, and the feeling that that disaster was only an acute expression of a deep-seated, chronic disease that was alive everywhere. And I claim that the spirit that created the Balfour Declaration was that spirit, the recognition that something should be done to save a people in that position.

Now as to the story of the Balfour Declaration itself, and its meaning. I can only quote a very few examples. In March, 1916, Sir Edward Grey cables to Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, telling him to enquire from the Russian Government what would be their attitude to a Zionist scheme. Sir Edward Grey gives the following formula of Jewish Zionist aspirations, and I shall be glad if the Commission will kindly retain this formula "Jewish Zionist aspirations." Sir Edward Grey says, "It seems to His Majesty's Government that the agreement would be much more attractive to most Jews if the scheme should foreshadow authorising the Jews, when their colonists in Palestine become strong enough to compete with the Arab population, to take into their hands the administration of the inner affairs of that region (except Jerusalem and the Holy Places)"

Secondly, in 1917 the Foreign Office circulated a number of handbooks, in order to prepare British public opinion and British Statesmen to the Peace Conference. One of those handbooks, "Zionism", was published by His Majesty's Stationery Office in 1920, but the preface says that it had been prepared and circulated as a manuscript in 1917. It gives, on the highest authority in the land, the following description of the "Jewish Zionist aspirations": "Jewish opinion would prefer Palestine to be controlled for the present as a part, or at any rate as a dependency, of the British Empire, but its administration should be largely entrusted to Jews of the colonist type. Zionists of this way of thinking believe that under such conditions the Jewish population would rapidly increase until the Jew became the predominant partner of the combination." Thirdly, just before the Balfour Declaration was published, in 1917, there was a polemic in the "Times" between members of the Zionist and the anti-Zionist sections of the British Jewish community. Lord Rothschild published his formula of the "Jewish Zionist aspirations" in the "Times" of May 28th, 1917: "We Zionists cannot see how the establishment of an autonomous Jewish commonwealth under the aegis and protection of the Allied Powers can be considered for a moment to be in any way subversive", and so on. Those are only three examples. I could flood this room with about twenty-five proofs of what were the "Jewish Zionist aspirations" as known to the British Government at the time of the gestation of the act called the Balfour Declaration. And now may I call your attention to the Balfour Declaration itself, that letter to the same Lord Rothschild, which is usually quoted in a truncated way. People usually forget its preamble. It has a preamble, which says,

"Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with the Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved of by the Cabinet."

You will certainly know that every word of the Balfour Declaration and letter had been sifted for months and months. Lord Balfour himself was a very cautious, I might almost say a "ca' canny" gentleman in the selection of his words. His information as to the "Jewish Zionist aspirations" was the best available; it was official, and that is the comment on the meaning of that evasive and elusive term "National Home". We are all well aware that if in a certain legal document or political document certain portions or terms are vaguely worded, one of the ways of elucidating their meaning is by "context." Here is the context. Apart from which I have been trying to ask all Englishmen what is the meaning of the English word "home"? You, of course, know the quotations ("my castle" etc.) which I got in answer. In politics, unfortunately, the word is found very rarely, but there is one exception, Home Rule, known to everyone. What is the meaning of "Home" Rule? What is the meaning if you promise a people a National "Home"? Some place where they will be at someone else's mercy because they will be a minority? Or some place where they will be defended from destruction only by the fact that there is present some foreign watchman who will not allow them to be destroyed? The Mandate itself contains in the preamble these words: the Allied Powers "recognise the grounds for re-constituting their (the Jewish People's) National Home in Palestine". The Mandate had also been sifted sufficiently to eliminate any word which might convey a forbidden meaning. You cannot "reconstitute" but something which has already existed. That was the meaning of the Mandate and of the Balfour Declaration, as understood by Mr. Winston

5642. What is the date of that?—March 13th, 1916, published by the Soviet Government in 1924.

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Churchill, who said so; by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who said so in print, and I can quote it; by Lord Cecil, who said so; by General Smuts, who said so; by Sir Herbert Samuel, who said so. Every one of them understood the promise to mean a Jewish State. If necessary, I will produce the quotations, but perhaps the most interesting one would be that of a Captain Hopkin Morris, who was a member of the Shaw Commission. The Shaw Commission had the opportunity, here in London, of listening to quite a long evidence quoting the proofs that the Balfour Declaration was a promise to facilitate the creation of a Jewish State with a Jewish majority, after which Captain Hopkin Morris, on November 17th, 1930, delivered a speech across that hall, in the House of Commons. In that speech he says, "The Jews are perfectly right. What was promised them meant a Jewish State. They were led so to think." And he mentioned a number of names, Mr. Churchill and Sir Herbert Samuel among others, who had spoken to them of a Jewish State. Well, Sir, that was the promise.

The question was asked whether the Mandate is a "Bible." The Bible is unique and I would not call the Mandate a Bible, but I think between those two appreciations of the value of a document, a "Bible" and a scrap of paper, there is a large range of varying degrees of respect, and I think the meaning put by the authors of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate into those documents is worthy of a high degree of respect. Mr. Churchill lent his name to a document called the 1922 White Paper. If necessary, I will go into an analysis of it, but here permit me to state that the White Paper of 1922 does not contain one single sentence, or one single word, which can be construed as precluding the transformation of Palestine into a country with a Jewish majority, a "Jewish State."

I also beg to submit that the Trans-Jordan Resolution of the League of Nations does not contain anything which precludes the inclusion of that region into the area of Jewish colonisation, independently of the question whether the temporary arrangement of indirect administration should or should not be kept up for a certain time.

My Lord and Gentlemen, here we come to the beginning of a very sad chapter. I will do my best to put it to you as moderately as I can. You will certainly use patience and perhaps more than patience with a man who has to tell you about a very great disappointment. I always thought before coming to England, that if a civilized country, a civilized Government, assumed a trust, internationally, under such conditions, with such implications, dealing with a people who have so long suffered and who have so long hoped and whose hopes are, after all, sacred to every Englishman, I expected that Government to sit down and prepare a blue-print, a plan, "how to do it." Under whatever interpretation of that "home" promise, there should have been a plan how to build it; what were to be the implication of "placing a country under such administrative, economic, and political conditions as might facilitate the establishment" of whatever you mean by the Jewish National Home. That was one condition—a plan; and the second condition was letting it be clear to all that that was the trust they have accepted and "That is what we are going to do." That blue-print or planning should begin with a geological survey of both sides of the Jordan, in order to ascertain what parts of the territory are really reclaimable, cultivable; a scheme for their amelioration and reclamation; a scheme of a loan which should be launched and which the Jews would have to provide, to pay for the amelioration and parcellation and for creating a land reserve on both sides of the Jordan, out of which both Jewish and Arab applicants for

agricultural settlement could be satisfied. Further, a plan of industrial development calculated to provide sustenance for large-scale immigration; a plan of what tariff laws and customs measure should be adopted in order to protect that development; a plan for a taxation system, as in every country under colonisation, adapted to assisting the new settlers and the new-comers. Finally, a measure for guaranteeing security. A nation with your colossal colonising past and experience surely knows that colonisation never went on without certain conflicts with the population on the spot, so that the country had to be protected; and as the Jew never asked to be protected by someone else, the plan should embody the Jewish demand that they should themselves be allowed to form a protecting body in Palestine, or at least a considerable part of it. Especially there should be a very careful selection of Civil Servants. Such a work, unparalleled, unprecedented, certainly needs Civil Servants first of all sympathetic and, secondly, acquainted with the work. There should be some special examination, some new branch of the Service. That is what everybody expected. I need not tell you how totally disappointed we were in hearing, instead of all that, the expression "muddling through," hearing it even mentioned as something desirable and commendable as a system. On more solemn occasions it was called "empiricism" and sometimes "going by horse sense." I do not know if all this be good for the Empire: it is not for me to judge. I can only say that we have greatly suffered under this absence of system, this deliberate aversion from making plans while undertaking something very new, very important, and very responsible. We have suffered terribly. Yet whenever we complained we got the strange reply—"The man on the spot knows better." May I submit most respectfully that the Mandate was granted to Great Britain by fifty nations because those fifty nations believed in Britain's collective experience and conscience, and especially in the fact of their close control over the man on the spot. The idea of control by a nation over its executives is an English idea. We Continentals learned it from the English. So, in our submission, the Mandatory Government cannot discharge its Mandatory duty by selecting even a genius and appointing him as the man on the spot. But that was practically always their reply. "We have appointed a man on the spot, let him do it, and we shall wait and see." Or sometimes we got another reply—"Probably the Government is administered quite satisfactorily, because both Jews and Arabs have grievances and complaints." We could never understand this. Is my duty, for instance, with regard to my two children, or with regard to my two clients, sufficiently discharged if I have managed to make myself obnoxious to both of them? I do not think so. We were terribly disappointed by the absence of a system and plan. We were even more disappointed by the absence of the second requirement, clarity. The Arabs were never told what the Balfour Declaration was meant by Lord Balfour and all the others to mean. They were never told. Here again I am going to limit myself, as being perhaps a sufficient illustration of that attitude to truth, to recalling a little story which has been told to this Commission in Palestine: that instead of writing on coins, etc., "*Eretz Israel*" they just write the two Hebrew letters for "E.I." Why? What is the meaning of it? If the country is to be called *Eretz Israel*, Land of Israel, if that is the name avowed and avowable, then print it in full; if it is something which cannot be allowed, remove it. But the "way out" adopted in this case illustrates the whole "system," which is to hint that there is the Balfour Declaration and perhaps there is something in it, but then again perhaps there is nothing in it. That has been the "system" from the beginning

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to the end. If questioned, I am prepared to support this reproach by many facts, but I believe the Royal Commission have already had sufficient information to form their own judgment. I shall have only to dwell upon one or two aspects. The first is this. If a Government goes to a country in order to administer it for a purpose which is anyhow pro-Jewish and sympathetic to the Jews, the selection of officials should be, first of all, subordinate to this rule—select persons who are sympathetic. I maintain, and it is very bitter for me to be obliged to do so, that that rule has not been observed in the Palestine Administration, and that the Administration has been allowed to get filled with persons whose attitude to Zionism and even to Jews was just the reverse of sympathetic. Moreover, they were allowed to do it in a demonstrative way. In July, 1925, the "Nineteenth Century" published an article by a certain Mr. Richmond vibrating not with anti-Zionism but really with hatred of the Jews.

5643. We have had that evidence?—So I suppose you have already drawn your conclusions from the fact that a few weeks after that, or a few months after that, that gentleman was appointed in the Palestine Government.

What I want to bring out is this. I want to speak in defence of the Arabs. How can the Arab in Palestine interpret this "system"? The Government have done something, yet they do not want to admit it fully, and they apologise for it; and at the same time they consider that a man who hates the Jews, who proclaims that the Mandate is an "iniquitous document," should be allowed to be appointed in Palestine in the Upper Chamber of the Government. What can the Arabs conclude except one thing? I think, Lord Peel, you had to remark to an Arab witness, "Can you not credit England with a little will of her own?" I am sorry to say it, but they cannot.

5644. I went as far as that, did I?—I am sorry to say it, but it is so.

5645. *Sir Laurie Hammond*: Who was High Commissioner at that time?—What time?

5646. The period to which you refer?—*Sir Herbert Samuel*. I accept all the Jewish part of the responsibility for *Sir Herbert Samuel*, but you must accept your British part of the responsibility for that High Commissioner and his systems.

5647. *Sir Horace Rumbold*: How can you divide the responsibilities?—*Sir*, you would not suggest that I should accept all the responsibility for an eminent British statesman who happens to be a Jew? I really think that *Sir Herbert Samuel* in Palestine acted as a Britisher, according to his lights. I would do him that credit at least: he certainly never forgot that he was a British official, a British Governor, carrying out a British international obligation. But I have got to defend the Arabs. How can they understand that "system"? Only in one way. "England is obviously forced to do something against her will." If I were an Arab that is the way I would interpret the *Richmond* fact and all these other cases of shilly-shallying that could be quoted. I think the main underlying cause of this outbreak and of all the other outbreaks was the absence of a plan, which made everybody, especially the Arabs, come to this conclusion. "The European, the Englishman," so they thought "when he wants to construct something, prepares a blue-print; when he does not prepare a blue-print—well, I know what it means." In addition there was the absence of candour in not telling the Arab, "You are confronted with a certain decision of the world, and that will be done; this country is to become not 'E. I.', but 'Eretz Israel'." This country is going to be 'reconstituted' as a Jewish Natural Home." As that has not been told him, the Arab's idea was "Probably there is something wrong in it; probably England is being forced; probably England hates it and *Richmond* is typical

because he hates it; but they have got to carry it out, so that if I, the Arab, can provide them with a good pretext and a noisy one . . ." Thus, again and again, the Arabs have been enticed and are being enticed into doing what we have seen in Palestine.

Now here came that monkey wrench thrown into our machinery, the question of the Legislative Council. First of all, I protest against the Legislative Council because it is in contradiction to the terms of the Mandate's obligation on any interpretation of it. That prominent expert, *M. Van Rees*, was the first to say that, under the Mandate, "the Jewish People have got to be considered as virtually inhabitants of Palestine." After that you cannot create so-called representative institutions in which that larger partner, the Jewish people, is represented as a minority and the smaller partner, the population on the spot, is represented as a majority. Either reject the Mandate, and the Balfour Declaration, or else draw the natural conclusions from them. Nor can it be in any way construed that the "development of representative institutions," which can be "developed" by a long series of easy stages, should be allowed at any time to interfere with that very aim mentioned in the preamble which is, after all, the crux of the problem and the foundation of the Mandate. But it is not only that. I am now speaking of the effect on the Arabs of this Legislative Council scheme, of dangling it before them from time to time. Here again I must mention something which I saw quoted about the experience of the Royal Commission itself. A prominent member of this Commission suggested to an Arab witness the following considerations. "Do you not think, although you are only offered the beginning of a Legislative Assembly, do you not think it might, if you had accepted it in 1921, have by now developed into the whole loaf?" That Arab gentleman had mentioned the "whole loaf" previously, indicating, "We want a National Arab Government, which will be able to allow or disallow Jewish immigration"; that was what he called "the whole loaf"; to which that prominent member of the Commission said, "Do you not think, had you accepted in 1921 that small beginning, that nucleus, it would have developed by now into the whole loaf?" Secondly, when that witness said "But this is only a legislative body," the prominent member of the Commission suggested, "Oh, but do you not know that the Executive very often has to dance according to the Legislative?" Perfectly right, words of wisdom; but since it is so, why had we Jews been told that the Legislative Council scheme was something harmless, that there would be "safeguards," that it would not affect our interests? It was perfectly right to say what you said, *Sir*. It was so right and so obvious that every Arab always interpreted that scheme in that very manner: "If the British are so insistent that we should have a Legislative Council it means 'Here you have a weapon; here you have the pistol; I do not give you the ammunition yet, but you wait, you accept the pistol and learn how to use it and the time will come when we will hand you the ammunition too'".

The results of all this were clearly inevitable. I must say that the man on the spot, His Excellency the High Commissioner, knew it for years; he had been told it in so many words in the presence of witnesses, "This business of the Legislative Council is bound to end in the only possible way." The House of Commons and the House of Lords showed—I am expressing it very mildly—no enthusiasm for this scheme of a Legislative Council at this moment; and the reply was "The man on the spot wants it." Well, we have seen the results.

A very important factor in implementing the Mandate is looking after security. I presume the Commission have already had time to draw their own conclusions as to that, but it is my duty to

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remind them of a few aspects of it. In Palestine we were always threatened with pogroms; we were telling so to the Government for years and years, but they went on cutting down and cutting down the number of troops in Palestine. We said "Remember that we have children and wives; legalise our self-defence, as you are doing in Kenya." In Kenya until recently every European was obliged to train for the Settlers' Defence Force. Why should the Jews in Palestine be forced to prepare for self-defence underhand; as though committing a legal offence? You know what a pogrom means in Jewish history; we know what pogroms mean in the history of Mandatory Palestine. The Jews have never been allowed to prepare for that holy duty of self-defence, as every Englishman would have done. We had in our case to prepare by underhand methods, with insufficient equipment, with insufficient drilling, in an amateurish way. I really do not know how a Government can allow or tolerate such a state of things after three experiences, of which 1929 was a terrible one. I am sorry if I am getting excited, and I apologise to the Commission and hope they understand the reason for it; but I do not think I have over-stepped the boundaries of logic in submitting to this Royal Commission my case. If you cut down the troops in Palestine far beyond the limit of safety, and the explanation is that the British taxpayer does not want to give his money nor his sons, that is quite natural; but we, the Jews of all parties, have for years been demanding, "Why have you disbanded the Jewish Regiment? Why not allow the Jews to take over, our men and our money under British command and under British military law?" I do not claim a "Jewish Army" before there is a Jewish State: we want the Jewish Regiment just as it existed during the War, rendering decent service. Why should the impression be created in this country that we want Johnny, Tommy and Bobby to defend us? We do not. If in the building of Palestine sweat and gold have to be employed, let us give the sweat and let us give the gold: if blood has to be shed by the defenders of Palestine, let it be our blood and not English blood. But that suggestion has always been turned down.

I need hardly mention here the press agitation, which would never have been tolerated in any other country, the press agitation preparing pogroms. You have certainly heard of the spectacular funeral of the Arab bandit in Haifa which was transformed into a real celebration. It was, I understand, the greatest Arab celebration ever seen in Haifa. You have certainly heard it compared with the order that the Jews had to bury their dead during the last disturbances at 5 o'clock in the morning, even in Tel Aviv, a purely Jewish locality, so that there should not be any redundancy about it.

I do not know if you have heard of the warnings. I have no doubt there have been warnings galore, but one of them I can produce black upon white. A fortnight before the events, on the 6th April, a telegram was sent to the High Commissioner informing him disturbances were coming and we called his attention to the fact that the troops were not sufficient and the police not sufficiently reliable. A copy of that telegram was sent to the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office acknowledged it, saying they were in communication with the High Commissioner, but they disclaimed, of course, that the military defence of Palestine was insufficient. There was one battalion at that time, the 6th April, and they denied the military protection was insufficient! My Lord and Gentlemen, is it neglect, omission, commission? What is all this, and where are the sanctions?

I should come here to the supreme illustration of that of your Terms of Reference—as to how the Mandate is being implemented in regard to the chapter of security; to the 1936 events themselves. I know the attitude of the Commission in this regard, but, My Lord, allow me to mention that in

all this tragedy our main grievance is "Why has the British Government allowed us Jews to be so undeservedly humiliated in the eyes of the Arabs and of the British?" You know very well we have sufficient numbers of splendid youth out there in Palestine; trained youth. Had they been allowed to take their due part, had they been made use of from the beginning, the riots would not have taken these dimensions. Why has it been found necessary to convey to every Arab that the Jews are incapable of defending themselves? We have been asking, we have been demanding it on our knees, "Let us defend the country." It was turned down. On the contrary, an exaggerated number of British battalions were sent out to Palestine—twenty-three British battalions, one sixth of the Imperial army almost, six brigades, to settle disorders in a country which is not one thousandth part of the British Empire, making the man in the street think "All the King's horses and all the King's men are being sent." The inevitable inference is clear. Zionist policy is broken and cannot be repaired; this is what it means governing Palestine—to mobilise, to stop the manoeuvres at Aldershot, to call up the reservists to restore order in Palestine. But I deny it. By mobilising five thousand Jewish youths in the course of the months of April and May you would have stopped the riots. There was no need for all these brigades. The danger was not so big; the extent not so great. If you are interested you can call any number of military experts here and they will tell you that with two or three thousand rebels, in a country like Palestine, which has no defiles, no gorges, where every mountain looks like half an orange and aeroplanes can scan the whole country, there was not the slightest need for this disturbance to go on for so long, nor for such a mobilisation of brigades. Yet that mobilisation has placed us in the position as if our Halutzim were not pioneers but cowards. I deny it. I demand that we should take our part in protecting Palestine and then Palestine will be protected and peaceful.

As I said I know the attitude of this Commission in refusing to dwell on the actual course of the riots, and I have to bow before it. On the other hand—here again I must ask not about this Commission, but about the Colonial Office, about the Mandatory Government—is there a plan? Is there a line of action? Mr. Eden in Geneva, most formally, in so many words, promised the League's Council that "a Royal Commission" had been appointed to investigate the prevailing unrest, that they would investigate the facts; and the Permanent Mandates Commission was persuaded to abstain from asking questions until "a Royal Commission"—I do not say *this* Royal Commission—until a Royal Commission had investigated actual events. This Royal Commission is of course sovereign to refuse to do so, and I can understand their motives, but where is then that Royal Commission which will investigate who is guilty? Because I claim somebody is guilty. I claim that a tremendous amount of ammunition for the Arabs has been allowed to percolate into Palestine both before and during the events. I claim there was neglect of duty in examining the first victims. I claim there is something I want to understand but do not understand in the fact that, while there was a general strike in Jaffa, there was no general strike in Haifa. I want to understand whether it is true there had been some gentleman's agreement—a "revolt by leave" in one part of Palestine, but no revolt where it was requested by somebody in office that there should not be revolt. I want to understand why Mr. Kawukji was allowed to depart from Palestine in state; why the bands were allowed to disband; why there was no subsequent disarmament of the population. I want to know why it is that such things can happen in a country and nobody is guilty, nobody is responsible. With this famous theory of the man on the spot, I want the man on the spot

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to stand before a Royal Commission, before a Judicial Commission, and I want him to answer for his errors. Sometimes even a humble man like myself has the right to say the words "J'accuse". They are guilty. They are guilty of commission, omission, neglect of duty. If I am not mistaken, somebody has to answer to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, who gave you the Mandate. Who is going to answer? I am informed that, instead of by this Royal Commission, a report on the events will be presented in a general way in the report of the British Government to the League of Nations. The party whom we accuse will present it. I submit to this Royal Commission, among your recommendations as to remedies (because you are requested in your terms of reference to mention remedies), the first is to find the guilty ones and to punish them. Also enquire about the Supreme Moslem Council, or whatever is the official description of that group of persons headed by His Eminence the Mufti and the other gentlemen. The Government gave them a sort of diplomatic immunity. The Government negotiated with them. I submit most respectfully and humbly that some independent Commission, independent of the Colonial Office and independent of the man on the spot, should enquire and investigate into this question of guilt. I believe it is guilt, and I believe that the person guilty should be punished, and that is what I humbly demand.

As to the remedies, the main remedy in my opinion is the plan and the truth. Arabs and Jews should be informed what the real implications of the Mandate are. To my way of thinking there is only one way of interpreting the Mandate. And a Scheme should be prepared. We call it a Ten Year Plan. In our opinion it should embrace agrarian reforms, taxation and customs reforms, a reform of the Civil Service, opening up of Trans-Jordan for Jewish penetration, and assurance of public security by the establishment of a Jewish contingent and by the legalisation of Jewish self-defence.

At the same time, I think on the Jewish side too reforms are necessary, for we have also committed many errors in our own systems. In my opinion it all culminates in the reform of the Jewish Agency. I was asked by Lord Peel whether we represented a body distinct from the Jewish Agency. Yes. We claim that the Jewish Agency *de facto* does not to-day represent the whole or even the majority of Zionist Jewry, and we think the time has come when this body should be re-built, with the consent of the Mandatory, on the basis of universal suffrage, because the problem of Zionism to-day has really become the interest of practically everybody in Jewry, no longer only of adherents of a particular political group. We think that reform is quite timely and it might put an end to many abuses which I cannot deny. One of them will be brought to the knowledge of this Commission in the report of the "Betar"—the Brit Trumpeldor organisation—on the distribution of certificates, about which this Commission have received, to my great regret, misleading information from some other Jewish representatives.

5648. *Chairman*: Are you going to tell us where it is misleading? What is the main point?—Yes, if you will allow me another ten minutes. There is a suggestion that, when we are asking for what I am asking for, that we are trying to involve this Empire in formidable complications and obstacles. I deny it. To the best of my belief I affirm—and I am not the only one—that should Great Britain go this way and really help us to save the Jewish people, as it was meant and promised in the Balfour Declaration, the course of this great experiment will be as normal as the course of any other great enterprise of social evolution. We utterly deny that it means bringing Great Britain into conflict with world Islam, we utterly deny that it means a real physical conflict with the neighbouring states,

we deny all this. It has been exaggerated beyond any recognition. It is not true. Given a firm resolve, made clearly known to both Jews and Arabs, all this will be performed with the normal smoothness of any other equally big colonisation enterprises.

As to keeping the country quiet and avoiding disturbances, I have already submitted—try what has never been tried, try re-establishing the Jewish Regiment as part and parcel of the permanent garrison. Try legalising Jewish self-defence. It is anyway almost inevitable. Jewish self-defence is "practically" legalised to-day: it is and it is not; it "should not" exist, but it does exist; it "should not" be armed, but if it is armed; well . . . and so on. Well, I think the decisive step should be made in the necessary direction.

You have of course heard of compromises and half-way houses which are being suggested, including cantonisation, or the parity scheme, or the cultural *rapprochement*, or the Jews "giving in" and so on. Believe my sincerity, and it is the sincerity of the whole movement, the sincerity of every Jew I now am trying to voice: we wish a half-way house could be possible, but it is perfectly impossible. We cannot accept cantonisation, because it will be suggested by many, even among you, that even the whole of Palestine may prove too small for that humanitarian purpose we need. A corner of Palestine, a "canton"—how can we promise to be satisfied with it? We cannot. We never can. Should we swear to you we would be satisfied, it would be a lie. On what other point can we "give in"? What can the "concession" be on the part of Oliver Twist? He is in such a position that he cannot concede anything: it is the workhouse people who have to concede the plateful of soup, and there is no way out of it. We do not believe in any compromise on those lines. Cantonisation is a dream and parity is a lie. It will never be enforced or believed by anybody; and trying it again and again means prolonging the state of thing which, in my submission, has led to the riots of 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1936 and it will lead again to the same result.

There is only one way of compromise. Tell the Arabs the truth, and then you will see the Arab is reasonable, the Arab is clever, the Arab is just; the Arab *can* realise that since there are three or four or five wholly Arab States, then it is a thing of justice which Great Britain is doing if Palestine is transformed into a Jewish State. Then there will be a change of mind among the Arabs, then there will be room for compromise, and there will be peace.

It is my very unpleasant duty to wind up by taking into consideration a melancholy pessimistic contingency—what will happen if what the Jews desire cannot be conceded by Great Britain. I wish I could omit mentioning that contingency for many reasons, personal reasons, Jewish national reasons; but to omit it is impossible. We are asked very often: "What is meant by the Balfour Declaration—it was promised in 1917, but since then perhaps the British people have honestly come to the conclusion that they cannot do it." I deny it. I affirm they can. But when I am asked, when any Jew is asked, "What? Are the Jews going to pin us down to the promise and to say 'You have promised the pound of flesh. Pay us the pound of flesh'?" Gentlemen, here I answer you in the name of the most extreme of Zionist parties: "No." If Great Britain really is unable to do it—not unwilling, but unable—we will bow to her decision; but we then shall expect Great Britain to act as any Mandatory who feels he cannot carry out the Mandate—give back the Mandate—

5649. *Sir Laurie Hammond*: To whom?—And do it in a way which will not harm either the safety of the Jews who trusted you and came to Palestine or the chances of a Zionist future. This means

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letting a certain time elapse while the Mandatory together with the Jews will look for the alternative. I hope that time will never come. I am fully convinced that it will not be necessary. I believe in England just as I believed in England twenty years ago, when I went against nearly all Jewish opinion and said "Give soldiers to Great Britain," because I believed in her. I still believe. But if Great Britain really cannot live up to the Mandate—well, we shall be the losers; and we will sit down together and think what can be done; but not that Great Britain should go on holding the Mandate and pretend it is "fulfilled" while my people are still suffering in the Diaspora and still only in a minority in Palestine. No, that cannot be done. That is not cricket: therefore, Gentlemen, I submit that it cannot be done, and it shall not be done.

I thank the Commission very much for their kindness and attention. I beg your forgiveness for having kept you for an hour and a half.

5650. *Chairman*: You will appreciate the fact that a good many of the points you have put before us, though they may have been particularly forcibly put by you, were not unfamiliar to us, and therefore I only really want to ask you one or two questions. My first question is this. You and those you represent, the Revisionists, and what I may call the more Orthodox Zionists agree in a great many points? Is not that so?—It is for them to decide.

5651. What I was going to ask you is this. Your attitude is so judicial I am almost afraid of putting the question to you. I was going to ask what is the main line of policy in which you differ from what I may call the orthodox Zionist?—Will you allow me just as a matter of personal favour to forgo this question, because it would lead me into criticism of another Jewish body, which is really something I should like to avoid. Instead of which let me say what is the main difference between us and them. The main difference to-day is that we insist that the Jewish Agency, the Jewish representation, should be based upon the universal suffrage principle, whilst the Zionist Organisation bases it on a fee called the *shekel*, a paid franchise.

5652. I agree, but that is only a question of machinery?—If you like.

5653. I do not want to press you, if you do not like to state what is the main difference between your views and those of the orthodox Zionists?—I can put it very mildly and say that I think the same reproach applies to them as I tried to apply to the Colonial Office—no "blue print." They have no plan; they never had any plan of what they meant by colonising Palestine or carrying out the Zionist programme. They never had one and the first attempt to translate the word "Zionism" into paragraphs of certain demands to the Mandatory and certain demands to ourselves (including definite attitudes to social problems), the first attempt at drawing up such a plan was the Revisionist programme. That is where we differ from them.

5654. You mean you are more definite in your scheme of planning?—Yes.

5655. Than you think the others are?—I am forced to say I think we are definite.

5656. I do not wish to force you?—Not that we are more definite. We are definite: they are not.

5657. You think you have the brains really?—It is a great question whether it requires more "brains" to be straightforward than not to be straightforward. I do not know. It is a "moot" point, as I think you call it in English.

5658. I would not ask you this, but I think there is one specific point you wish to make. You told us some of the evidence that was presented by the Jewish Agency before us as to immigration was—I think you used the word "misleading"?—Yes.

5659. I am sorry we have been misled in that way. Have you any definite point in which you differ?—Yes.

5660. Will you state it?—Yes. It was quoted in the organ of the Jewish Agency that they informed the Commission that the distribution of certificates between adherents and non-adherents of the Zionist Movement was done without any discrimination. I read it in their own paper. That is a misleading statement. There is discrimination against at least one section—the Brit Trumpeldor; and that discrimination has been ordered in black upon white by the Jewish Agency, for the only reason that the Brit Trumpeldor had "left the Zionist Organisation." The case has been submitted to the Royal Commission in a memorandum of the Betar. Your Secretary wrote to our representatives in Palestine that there was no time or possibility to see a representative of the Betar (which is our youth organisation) but that a memorandum would be studied, and now that memorandum has been sent in.

5661. You spoke about this Legislative Council at some length and you used the phrase I think rather critically, that this had been "dangled" before the Arabs, suggesting it ought not, I think, to have been put before the Arab population?—Yes.

5662. May I ask you then how you construe Article 2 of the Mandate? You are very familiar with it, of course. That "the Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country"—you know the words—and "the development of self-governing institutions" Would it not be really the duty of the Mandatory Power under that Article to suggest the "development of self-governing institutions" and among them the Legislative Council and so on? You seem to talk as if it were really wrong, a dereliction of duty almost on the part of the Mandatory Power, to "dangle" as you call it these suggestions before the Arabs?—The Commission will of course excuse me for the word "dangle".

5663. It does not matter about the word. It is a very good phrase really?—It may be a little too colloquial a word to use before such an august body. Paragraph 2 is obligatory. It contains two injunctions. "Shall be responsible for placing the country under such political" and so on "as will secure the establishment of a Jewish national home as laid down in the preamble and the development of self-governing institutions". There are two obligations there. Certainly the second one should be conducted so as not to preclude the carrying out of the first one. You certainly know our Jewish contention, which I fully share, that the main purpose of the Mandate is the building up of the Jewish National Home; therefore all other measures, which are, of course, most necessary, should only be "developed" in that measure and at that speed which will not interfere with the main task of building the Jewish National Home. In our submission "development" means gradual development, and certainly such stages of that development as could prejudice the possibilities of Jewish immigration into the country should not be allowed to arise before that danger has disappeared. That danger certainly exists. I can quote any number of British representatives at Geneva who admitted that hosts of safeguards would be necessary so that the Legislative Council as conceived by Sir Arthur Wauchoppe should not interfere with Jewish immigration. That is what we mean. I do not for one moment deny that it is the duty of the Mandatory to conduct the country towards self-governing institutions. The Mandatory promised to conduct the country towards self-governing institutions—by stages of development which on no account and at no moment should stultify the Mandatory's main duty. Nothing is said in this Article about a Legislative Council. What is said here is "self-

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governing institutions". I need not suggest to you what a wide range of "self-governing institutions" there is.

5664. I agree. I was going to put that point to you to make it clear. So that from those self-governing institutions, to the development of which the Mandatory, I will not say is pledged, but is ordered to attend, from that you exclude a Legislative Council?—Postpone, not exclude.

Chairman: Postpone is rather a vague word. I do not know what it means. It may mean a long long time.

5665. *Sir Horace Rumbold:* Until you have a majority?—Until we have a Jewish majority. In my submission it would be the safest way to wait until no trouble is possible, but as a dreamer I can admit another possibility. I was just hinting at the possibility of a change of mind among the Arabs if they are definitely told "Great Britain has promised to make Palestine a Jewish State by immigration; no harm will be done to you; no one will be ousted; you will live here; your minority rights, even when you become a minority, will be safeguarded; but the Jewish immigration will go on until they become a majority." If you say it sufficiently clearly there *will* be a change of mind among the Arabs. I cannot prove it, but I am sure it will be so. The moment there is a change of mind recognised by those, more privileged than I am, who live in Palestine, the moment the Jews in Palestine are convinced that there is a change of mind among the Arabs, and honest impartial observers say that the Arabs have become reconciled to this prospect, then I would be prepared to suggest to my people that they should consider the offer of a round-table conference. We might perhaps then come together as a happy family of three, the Jew, the Arab and the British adviser. Yet the safest way is this which you assume I suggested; wait until we are a majority there, and then you can have a Legislative Council, and then it will be exactly within the meaning of the word "development".

5666. *Chairman:* So when the draughtsman used these words "the development of self-governing institutions", he made a great number of mental reservations when he wrote that, did he not?—Was it a mental reservation to think that development should be slow?

5667. Not slow, but as I understand it you say so long as the Arabs are in a particular frame of mind or so long as they are not a minority, you would not have the Legislative Council, but you would have it when the Jews have a majority in Palestine?—Certainly.

5668. That being so, is it not rather a curious thing?—May I put it in a different way? The Mandate enjoins on the British Mandatory to facilitate something which is a process, the creation of a Jewish National Home. It is not yet there: it has to be formed. It is not something you can order to appear at once: it has to develop. At the same time, parallel—in my opinion of lesser importance but still parallel to it—there is the development of self-governing institutions. I think that the culminating point, the upper reach of the process of developing self-governing institutions should be timed to coincide with the fulfilment of the first process. When you have the Jewish National Home completed, then you can have the self-governing building completed too. But why should one choose the more dangerous half (and everyone recognises how dangerous it is) to be completed before the other is ready, unless it is to give the Arabs that "pistol" for which they might hope a little later to get the "ammunition," or that "bun" which can develop into the "whole loaf."

5669. It is a very difficult question of times that you have put before us, a synchronising movement?—My Lord it is not, the moment you agree on the principal. Will there be any difficulty in ascertaining the moment when the Jewish National Home is

achieved, fulfilled? The simplest way is to ask the Jews. I hope you will acknowledge that as long as the Jews say the Jewish National Home is not fulfilled, it is not fulfilled; but when reasonable, honest Jews will say "We think it is fulfilled and complete," then the time will come for completing also the second obligation.

5670. *Sir Horace Rumbold:* We have been told by a prominent leader it would never be fulfilled. There would never come a moment when he would be able to say the Jewish National Home exists?—I am surprised to hear of such an extremist. With me it will be easier; 51 per cent. of Jews in the population—and it is fulfilled.

Chairman: The man who said that was an orthodox Zionist.

5671. *Sir Horace Rumbold:* You spoke to us about the density of population and you speculated about the numbers which might settle down in Palestine on both sides of the Jordan. Density of population depends upon other factors which I am sure you will agree with, on fertility of the soil, on mineral resources, on the proximity of markets and on the industrial possibilities of the country. Now do you consider that those factors obtain in the case of Palestine?—Some of them do: some of them do not. We certainly all recognise that the fertility of the soil is unsatisfactory, although we all insist that it can be improved, that far more can be made of it, far more than is now. But what we contest is that agriculture in modern colonisation or in the modern law of population plays the same decisive role as it was supposed to play years ago. We think fertility one of the essential but minor considerations—not to speak of a country like England, whose healthy structure all the world envies and which has a very small agricultural population in proportion to the rest of the population. It is a noticeable fact that progress in every country coincides with the diminution of the part which agriculture plays in the economy of the country; so we think the fate of Palestine, at least so far as the Jews are concerned (but I think the Arabs will also progress on those lines) will be the urbanisation, the growing predominance of non-agricultural pursuits. Therefore the degree of the fertility of the soil, though I certainly recognise the importance of it, is not decisive. What is decisive in our submission, especially for an industrial and commercial people as we are, is the quality of the coloniser. We say that the absorptive capacity of a country depends upon the man; we say more, even the kind of its produce depends not upon nature but upon the man. You certainly know the anecdote of the man who denied there could be any textile industry in Lancashire, because he said cotton does not grow in England; nor any chocolate production in Switzerland, because the cocoa-tree grows somewhere else. That has nothing to do with production. I suggest that if England did grow cotton but had not the Lancashire population, maybe there would be no textile industry; for there are some countries producing cotton which have no textile industry. The main "natural riches" of a country are the men, their devotion, their skill, their culture, their world connections facilitating exchange, and their ability to mobilise capital either individually or publicly. We claim that Palestine, with its geographical position, whose advantages certainly do not escape you, will in the near future be very densely populated, perhaps not by us—that is another question—but its magnetism will be colossal because of its position. We could make of it a very important industrial and commercial country, and the absence of raw materials, I think, would not interfere with us any more than it does with Manchester.

5672. *Sir Laurie Hammond:* You referred just now to the possibility—and another witness who has come before us has made this reference—the possibility that Great Britain might have to abandon the Mandate or ought to abandon the Mandate, and

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[Continued.]

your suggestion, If I got it right, was, when I said to whom, you said they ought to consult with the Jews and the Jews and the Mandatory Power should consult together as to who should be the successor of Great Britain in taking on the Mandate. Is it a mere oversight you omitted to refer to the Arabs—two-thirds of the country belong to the Arabs at present—that there should be no consultation with them?—No.

5673. None?—None. The Mandate was given independently of the Arabs' attitude; the promise called Balfour's Declaration was given to us.

5674. And there was no underlying restriction that the position and civil and religious rights of the Arabs should not be damaged?—If the Mandate could be given to, and was accepted by, Great Britain without consultation with the Arabs, why should it not be accepted by some other Power without consultation with the Arabs? If it is vitiated, if it is dishonest, to accept a Mandate without the Arabs' consent, why did you accept it? Since you have accepted it, it means it does not vitiate the validity of that document. What it means is this: England can be trusted to look after the Arabs or the Arab minority; and even if there should be a consultation, which I hope there will never be, in order to find another Mandatory, then England is sufficiently capable and sufficiently to be trusted to see to it that the new Mandatory, whoever it may be, should give good guarantees that it will protect the Arabs whether a majority or a minority.

5675. So that Article 6 of the Mandate, which of course you know quite well—that the Administration of Palestine, while ensuring the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration and so forth—do you think that would be fulfilled in the way you have described?—Certainly, under England it will be fulfilled, no doubt; but I think I could nominate several other Powers whom I, as a European, would trust to carry out this Mandate as honestly as England would. Is there anybody here who doubts that there are other civilised peoples as conscientious? . . .

5676. *Chairman*: We had much better not mention names?—I have not, but there are.

5677. *Sir Laurie Hammond*: Then I gather you refer to the case of Mr. Richmond, which was mentioned to us in Palestine. You said "What are the Arabs to understand from that?" Curiously enough before us evidence was given to show that the appointment of the first High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, was objected to by the Arabs. They said—it is in that correspondence published by Mr. Winston Churchill—they said "Here you have appointed as the first High Commissioner a leading and a confirmed and an enthusiastic Zionist." Do you remember that?—Yes.

5678. Do you not think those two rather cancel out? You have on the one hand the Arabs who say what do they infer from Mr. Richmond's appointment and on the other hand you have the Mandatory trying to hold the balance even?—I think the Arabs should be given to understand "The Mandate means creating a Jewish State, and therefore we send to you High Commissioners who in our opinion are sympathetic to that idea." It is a different thing to convey to the Arabs "We have been forced to promise to the Jews the creation of a Jewish National Home, but in order to counterbalance it we are sending to Palestine a high official who is the enemy of this Mandate, calls it iniquitous, and says the Jews exploit their advantages as a dispersed people while they hypocritically tell the world it is a most unpleasant position." It is quite different. The inference in the case of Sir Herbert Samuel was quite legitimate: the inferences which proceed from Mr. Richmond's appointment are most undesirable and anti-Mandate.

5679. Then you would not agree with what Sir Herbert Samuel said when he was High Commis-

sioner, that "the degree to which Jewish national aspirations can be fulfilled in Palestine is conditioned by the rights of the present inhabitants"?—I do not agree with him; and since you quote Sir Herbert Samuel will you allow me to quote him too? The Revisionist definition of the aim of Zionism is taken from Sir Herbert Samuel's speech, and I can repeat it to you.

5680. *Chairman*: From the same speech?—No, another. He says that the aim of Zionism is—and this was said after the Balfour Declaration was given, two years afterwards—so "that in due course Palestine should become a self-governing Commonwealth under the auspices of an established Jewish majority." He said it when he was the trusted—

5681. *Sir Laurie Hammond*: What date was this?—November, 1919, when he was already the trusted adviser of the Government on Palestinian matters. He changed his mind since.

5682. The quotation I gave you was made on the 3rd June, 1921, in Palestine; so between the first one and this one he changed his mind?—What should I do, poor little me, confronted with a very prominent English Jewish statesman whose views change at a distance of a year and a half to such a degree? What can I say? Simply I dismiss both quotations.

5683. May I give you one more quotation? You referred to the statement of British policy which was issued by Mr. Winston Churchill and you said in no part of it could it be suggested for a moment it did not contemplate the eventual Jewish majority?—I say in no part of it does it "preclude" such an eventuality.

5684. This is the only part I should like you to explain to me, this point:

"His Majesty's Government would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine."

Does not that rather indicate . . . ?—No. First of all—will you allow me?—it may be as unparliamentary language as "dangle," but I call this quibbling. I claim that everybody uses the words "in Palestine" and "Palestine" in the same sense. You will find articles headed "Red Rule in Russia" or "Russia under red rule." You will find the same with the first Zionists. When I was only a boy they certainly wanted the whole of Palestine, yet the Basle programme of Zionism, published in 1897 speaks of "*Heimstätte in Palästina*." They never thought there was any difference. But the best proof is that Balfour himself uses both wordings. Here you have Balfour's speeches . . .

5685. I did not ask about Lord Balfour's speeches. I asked you about the point you made that there was nothing in this announcement of His Majesty's Government's policy in Command Paper 1700 by Mr. Winston Churchill which could indicate for a moment . . . ?—Excuse me. What I say is that those are just "well chosen words." . . .

5686. *Chairman*: He says it is quibbling. That is his answer?—I say it is quibbling.

5687. *Sir Laurie Hammond*: It seemed to me it was a phrase one could take as indicating His Majesty's Government at that time did not contemplate that it was necessary that there should be a Jewish majority in Palestine?—I do not think so. I know who is the author if this document ascribed to Mr. Churchill.

5688. *Chairman*: Mr. Churchill is responsible for this document?—If Mr. Churchill is responsible, then I would mention Mr. Churchill's speeches on the Jewish State dated 1920, saying that the Government promised the formation of a Jewish State. It means nothing?

5689. *Sir Laurie Hammond*: The reply is that that quotation I have given you might indicate

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that a Jewish minority was contemplated, but it is quibbling?—It cannot indicate that a Jewish minority was indicated. It cannot indicate that and I would ask any lawyer—

5690. *Chairman*: Do not go to the lawyers?—If I had the privilege of cross-examining you, instead of you cross-examining me, and if I asked you whether the Mandate can mean just a "pale of settlement" for Jews "in" Palestine, you would be at a loss to maintain it, because quibbling cannot be defended. Take the other point in that White Paper, "not subordinated"—the promise that the "Arabs will never be subordinated." Does being a minority mean being subordinated?

5691. *Sir Horace Rumbold*: It depends who exercises it?—I understand there is in this country a minority possessing very remarkable national qualities, the Scottish minority. Is anybody going to suggest that the Scots are subordinated?

5692. On the contrary, they think they dominate us?—It is a question of decency. Under a decent Government there is no danger of minorities being subordinated. Now, if in this White Paper minority means subordination, then the Jews, when in a minority, would be subordinated. Does it tally with the Jewish National Home idea—a country where the Jews are subordinated?

5693. *Sir Laurie Hammond*:

"When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole—"

—God forbid.

5694.

"but the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world?"

—Does not preclude the development of that minority into a Jewish majority of 90 per cent?

5695. It does not hold out a guarantee that there shall be a majority, nor does it preclude an Arab majority?—I simply say it does not preclude a Jewish majority: that is the only degree of attention I am prepared to give to that document.

5696. *Chairman*: Do you think that that document is not absolutely clear?—This document, of course, is not absolutely clear. I will go further. I think it is a document written in order to evade clear issues. This is one of the most typical productions of this category.

5697. It sounds like a Parliamentary document in that case?—I have very little Parliamentary experience. I was born in Russia.

5698. *Sir Laurie Hammond*: Then there is one more quotation I would give you. It is this:

"On a long view the Jewish village cannot prosper unless the Arab village prospers with it."

Would you assent to that?—Yes. I think on the whole it is true and I think Palestine, such as I dream of it, should be a country of very happy Arabs. I say what I dream.

5699. You claim as of right that Palestine should be the refuge of all the Jews of the Diaspora, regardless of the position of the Arabs, do you not? You say that the immigration into Palestine is to be conditioned by the needs of the Jews of the Diaspora. Surely that overlooks the requirements of the Arabs to an extent or can they be reconciled?—Of course they can. What we claim is that, if you give us what we call a colonising régime, a régime favouring our colonisation, we Jews will prove to you that in Palestine there will be room (as I said from the beginning) for the million of Arabs of to-day and for an additional million of their progeny and for many millions of Jews and for peace.

5700. *Sir Horace Rumbold*: Is not that rather an *ex parte* statement?—What can I do? Would you call it an *ex parte* statement if a person comes here and pleads in the name of a need. I should not call it *ex parte*. Is is not "*ex parte*." I simply represent distress; I speak in the name of the distressed. You may dismiss me and say it is impossible, but do not call it "*ex parte*."

5701. *Sir Laurie Hammond*: Then you gave us, so I gather, to understand that in this state the Arabs would be perfectly content and quite happy with you?—I hope so.

5702. And I rather gather you inferred it might be the case to-day, if they were only told straight out what the intentions of Government were—?—I said there would be a change of mind. I mean the Arabs would say "Let us try and come to terms with the Jews." As to the Arabs being "happy," I said that, when we shall become a majority and make the country rich and develop all its possibilities and utilise all its resources, then it will be a prosperity in which the Arabs will be happy. I never suggested the Mandatory could do that just by only "telling."

5703. You can make the Arabs happy? If that is the case, why is it that the surrounding Arab States, Syria, Iraq, Trans-Jordania, do not welcome the Jews and ask them to come and give them this great happiness?—Did I not tell you from the very beginning of the difference? If you speak of hardships to individual Arabs, I deny it; but if you suggest disappointment of the Palestinian Arabs as a whole with the prospect of a country they call Palestine, which they think is one of their national states, becoming a Jewish state, I quite admit there is disappointment. And if the Syrian Government thinks there should be five or six and not "only" four Arab States, so that the Arab Confederation—whatever it be called—may one day include Palestine too, then of course, it is a disappointment. I never denied it. But I said that is the claim of appetite as confronted with our claim of starvation and I think that a claim of appetite versus starvation has no standing whatever. They really demand "more."

5704. The Arabs demand more?—Yes.

5705. In what way?—They have many States already.

5706. I am talking of the Palestinian Arab? I am not concerned with the Arab in Iraq?—You mentioned Syria.

5707. But you gave me to understand, so I thought, that under the condition of affairs you would arrange—that you thought ought to be arranged—the Arabs would welcome the Jews. I want to know why they do not do it to-day?—I do not say welcome, but I say there would be a change of mind, in the sense that, seeing there was no way out, they would try and come to terms, and we would work it out together. As to "welcoming," I do not know about that.

5708. One necessary ingredient, one necessary factor is the arming of the Jews?—I would put it differently. If there is a need to keep in Palestine troops, we Jews claim they should be our troops. Here in England the man in the street is saying "Why do these Jews want us to defend them?" I say to the man in the street "We do not." That is one thing. Secondly, if this Commission can guarantee that Jewish colonies will not be attacked, or if this Commission can guarantee that when attacked they will be protected—please give that guarantee. As long as you cannot guarantee it, you cannot suggest any other way out except by allowing those who are threatened to be armed. Allow me to tell you this. In our submission citizens should not be armed. Citizens should all be disarmed. Only exceptionally, if I can prove to the Government that I have been threatened, in

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that case I may ask for a permission to go about with a pistol. Now "I," (in this case "I" stands for four hundred thousand Jews), I *have* been threatened, I am being threatened, in the press, everywhere, in the mosques; and I have already been attacked. Then, of course, it is different. Arming those who are threatened is a simple police matter: it has nothing to do with Jews, nothing to do with Zionism. Those who are threatened

should be armed, and people who threaten should be specially watched that they should not be armed—as in London.

5709. You think they would be disarmed?—As in London. If you have part of the community who are bullies (which you have not got here; but if you have) and they threaten to kill, they should be disarmed. Otherwise one would be committing murder if one left them armed.